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Numerous studies have found that, in general, democracy decreases intensity 
of ethnic rebellion. However, the recent transition experiences of 
multinational states problematize the assumption that social peace 
accompanies democratization. Especially in the post-Communist world, 
democratization has been followed by increases in ethnic rebellion. This 
dissertation explores the question of why some ethnic groups maintain or 
increase levels of rebellion following democratization while others rely on 
nonviolence or at least decrease the level of violence employed against the 
state. I conduct a large-N cross-national comparative investigation of these 
questions, employing Barry Weingast's (1998) reciprocal vulnerability 
framework, focusing on the impact of conflictual histories, political 
institutions, form of democratization and uncertainty. The analysis includes 
102 ethnic groups in 42 countries that attempted democratization between 
1980 and 2000 and employs data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, the 
  
Polity dataset and original data on ethnic participation in democratization, 
autonomy and federalism, and repression. Multiple statistical methods are 
employed to test 13 hypotheses derived from the reciprocal vulnerability 
framework. Findings provide only limited support for reciprocal vulnerability 
as a generalizable explanation of ethnic rebellion. However, findings strongly 
support grievance-based theories of ethnic rebellion, and provide limited 
support for collective action theory of ethnic rebellion, particularly in terms of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Post-Communist Puzzle 
Numerous studies have found that, on average, democracy decreases intensity 
of ethnic rebellion (see, e.g., Saideman et al. 2002, Gurr 2000). Although the 
conventional wisdom suggests that the relationship between democracy and internal 
peace is linear, recent experiences in democratizing states belie this line of thought. 
The transition experiences of the multinational states of post-Communist Europe, 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia problematize the assumption that social 
peace accompanies democratization. Gurr (2000) finds that in newly democratic 
states
1
, six of 25 ethnic groups in post-Communist states and eight of 43 groups in 
developing states exhibited increased rebellion; not a single ethnic group in post-
Communist states lowered levels of rebellion. In hybrid regimes (which Gurr defines 
as having a mixture of democratic and autocratic characteristics), he finds that eight 
of 27 groups in post-Communist states and 9 of 40 groups in developing states 
exhibited increased levels of rebellion; rebellion decreased in only two cases in the 
post-Communist world (Gurr 2000:158-161).
2
 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 summarize Gurr’s 
findings for newly democratic and hybrid regimes.  
                                                 
1
 Following the Polity dataset, Gurr defines new democracies as those states with fully or mostly 
democratic political institutions that were established between 1980 and 1994 and have not reverted to 
authoritarian rule since then. Transitional regimes – here called hybrid regimes – are countries whose 
regimes have a mixture of authoritarian and democratic features or countries that attempted transitions 
to democracy after 1970 that ended with temporary or enduring reversion to authoritarian rule. 
2
 It should be noted here ethnic group rebellion in any type of state is a relatively rare event. In new 
democracies, Gurr reports that 42 of 68 groups did not engage in any form of rebellion. Among 





Table 1.1 Changes in Ethnic Rebellion in Newly Democratic Regimes 
 Increase Decrease or No 
Change 
No Rebellion Total 
Post-
Communist 
6 0 19 25 
Developing 8 12 23 43 
 
Table 1.2 Changes in Ethnic Rebellion in Hybrid Regimes 
 Increase Decrease or No 
Change 
No Rebellion Total 
Post-
Communist 
8 2 17 27 
Developing 9 13 18 40 
 
Clearly, especially in the post-Communist world, democratization does not 
immediately lead to decreases in ethnic violence – and may in fact be followed by 
increases in levels of ethnic rebellion. Why – when democratization seems to promise 
increased levels of minority accommodation – do some ethnic groups continue to rely 
on violence while others rely on nonviolence? In particular, why are ethnic groups in 
post-Communist states more likely than groups in non-post-Communist states to 
increase rebellion following attempts to democratize? 
Overview of Approach 
This study conducts a large-N cross-national comparative investigation of 
these questions, employing Barry Weingast's (1998) reciprocal vulnerability 
framework. In this framework, the ability of each ethnic group within a state to 
                                                                                                                                           
also Laitin and Fearon 1996). Academic interest in ethnic violence stems not so much from the 
absolute number of violent ethnic campaigns as from their rapid increase in the 1990s and the 
magnitude of human suffering generated by the most severe examples (e.g., in Sudan, the former 




capture the governing apparatus of the state and subvert it for its own purposes 
creates vulnerability for all groups in the state, what Weingast terms “reciprocal 
vulnerability.”  Under certain conditions, to be discussed later, vulnerability can lead 
groups to engage in preemptive violence. 
The framework of reciprocal vulnerability may be especially relevant to 
societies undergoing large-scale political change, as the uncertainty inherent to such 
situations should intensify processes the framework highlights. While democratizing 
countries are not the only societies undergoing such change, they are a critical subset 
in the past quarter-century, both because of the number of countries undergoing 
democratization and because of growing international norms promoting 
democratization. 
 There are several reasons why such a study will advance the literatures on 
ethnic conflict and democratic transition. From an empirical standpoint, while several 
authors have noted the propensity of post-Communist states to experience ethnic 
violence following attempts to democratize, none has conducted a cross-national 
study that included both the post-Communist and developing world. The fact that 
post-Communist transitions have primarily been compared with other post-
Communist transitions makes it difficult for scholars to draw conclusions regarding 
why these ethnic groups seem more likely to engage in rebellion following transition. 
A cross-national study that includes both post-Communist states and other states 
attempting transitions in a similar time-frame will better define the scope of 
observations regarding democratic transitions and ethnic violence. Additionally, 




remain undemocratic, including the states of Central Asia, and still others have 
reverted to more authoritarian forms of rule, such as in Russia. Therefore, while this 
study has a historical value, it continues to have relevance for the future. 
Secondly, those studies that have been conducted have often focused on the 
state as the unit of analysis. For example, Roeder (1999) examined the propensity of 
post-Communist states to experience constitutional crises following democratization 
or liberalization. However, focusing on the state obscures the variation found within 
the state and may result in overemphasis on state-level characteristics without closer 
attention being paid to the dynamics of state-group relations, group-group relations or 
intra-group politics. 
 From a theoretical standpoint, while Weingast has used case studies to provide 
confirming evidence for the reciprocal vulnerability framework, it has not been 
subjected to large-N statistical tests. Furthermore, the cases Weingast selected to 
support his theorizing did not vary on the dependent variable, although they did 
represent different types of internal conflict. In both of his cases (the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia and the American Civil War), violence was the outcome. The 
selection of cases based on the dependent variable increases the risk of making 
incorrect generalizations. 
 From a policy-making standpoint, ethnic rebellion is costly in both human and 
economic terms not only for the state in which it occurs but also for the larger 
community of states. And while the onset of new ethnic rebellions has declined, the 
majority of authoritarian states currently attempting (or being encouraged to attempt) 




potential conflicts. Furthermore, eruptions of ethnic conflict have also short-circuited 
democratic transitions in several states, including Côte d’Ivoire, and have contributed 
to backsliding to less democratic rule in others, including Russia. Better 
understanding of what drives ethnic groups to adopt violence over nonviolence to 
seek redress of grievances in the context of democratization has the potential to guide 
policy so as both to avert large-scale violence and to promote the goals of democratic 
consolidation. International intervention and U.S. intervention in locales such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq underscore the needs of policymakers for pragmatic solutions to 
ethnic conflict management in the context of establishing democratic institutions. 
Outline of Chapters 
This study will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 gives a theoretical overview, in 
which Weingast’s theory of reciprocal vulnerability is elaborated and compared to 
competing theories for explaining ethnic conflict. Hypotheses are derived and 
explicated. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the methodology used to test the 
various hypotheses, including descriptions of the data being used. The relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methods are also discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 
present the results of the quantitative analyses with discussion. Chapter 6 summarizes 
key findings and their implications, in terms of both theoretical refinement and 





Chapter 2: Reciprocal Vulnerability and Why Ethnic Groups 
Rebel 
 
Pieces of the Puzzle 
Recent studies of the impact of democratization on the persistence of ethnic 
rebellion have discovered a differential effect depending on whether a state is post-
Communist. Post-Communist states – as most dramatically demonstrated by the states 
of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union – have tended to see an 
increase in ethnic violence while states in the developing world have more often seen 
democratization alleviate ethnic violence. Gurr (2000: 163) proposes four possible 
explanations for democratization in post-Communist countries leading to increased 
levels of ethnorebellion: 
1. Democratization provides ethnic entrepreneurs incentives for outbidding,1 
leaving minority peoples insecure.  
2. When central authority is weakened by the transition process, 
opportunities arise for the eruption of long-suppressed hostilities. 
3. Ethnofederal structures provide ethnic groups and their leaders with 
political and territorial bases. 
4. Institutions in new states (such as those of the former Soviet Union and 
former Yugoslavia) are too weak to contain (or inhibit) ethnorebellion. 
                                                 
1
 Outbidding occurs when ethnic politicians have an incentive to make increasingly extreme claims in 
order to capture or maintain the vote of members of their ethnic constituency. This can occur both 




While these four factors (ethnic outbidding, weakened central authority, ethnofederal 
structures, and new states) are not unique to the post-Communist experience, given 
the time frame of most previous analyses (1980s to the present), it is argued that these 
factors are concentrated in the post-Communist world and can help explain seemingly 
anomalous post-Communist cases. 
Snyder (2000) proposes that the intersection of weak political institutions and 
nationalist elite interests that are not adaptable to democracy lead to ethnic 
nationalism, with incidence of violence influenced by the levels of economic 
development, the level of threat to elite interests posed by democratization, and the 
nature of political institutions during the transitions. 
Ethnofederal structures, defined as federal units that are designed to be under 
the control of titular ethnic groups, have received much attention, especially among 
scholars of post-Communist states. Brubaker (1996) sees ethnofederal structures as 
one factor driving the break-up (sometimes violent) along ethnic lines of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union. Roeder (1999) focuses on ethnic machines (remnants of 
ethnofederal structures) as the explanatory variable for the increase of ethnorebellion 
in post-Communist states. Leff (1999) argues that the earlier democratization of 
ethnofederal units delegitimized the central state and led to the eventual disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Bunce (2004: 189), writing in the post-
Communist context, is blunt in her negative assessment of ethnofederalism, saying 
“Ethnofederalism emerges … as a highly problematic approach to the management of 
majority-minority relations. Ethnofederalism seems to undermine the state’s 




violence at that; and such a structure appears to complicate and sometimes derail the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy.” Skepticism regarding ethnofederalism’s 
merits is not limited to scholars of the post-Communist world. Mozaffar and Scarritt 
(1999) argue that ethnofederal structures are equally inappropriate for African states. 
However, not all assessments of ethnofederalism are negative. Lijphart (1977) 
in his work on consociationalism provides a classic example stressing the positive 
impact ethnofederalism can have. Horowitz (1985), using examples in India and 
Nigeria, stresses that ethnofederal structures provide a means for minority elites to 
satisfy political ambitions while diffusing any conflict that does occur away from the 
center. Gurr (1993, 2000) also notes that ethnofederal structures may satisfy minority 
grievances and allow the state to survive intact. Kymlicka (2000) notes that in 
Western liberal democracies, granting national minorities territorial or cultural 
autonomy has served to alleviate grievances and violence. 
State capacity is also frequently cited as a second contributing factor to the 
presence or absence of ethnic violence. Weak states are unable to control violence for 
two primary reasons: They lack the coercive resources to suppress outbreaks of 
violence, and they lack the material resources to accommodate or co-opt discontented 
minority groups (Gurr 2000; Benson and Kugler 1998). 
State response to ethnic demands is another factor that may lead to groups 
choosing violent means or escalating violence. In particular, several authors note that 
the use of repression may result in equally violent responses on the part of ethnic 






Most of the authors discussed above take a primarily structuralist viewpoint in 
explaining the persistence or cessation of ethnic rebellion in the context of 
democratizing states. However, often the macrostructural foci of such authors obscure 
the mechanisms by which certain institutions lead to ethnic group conflict with the 
state. I will argue that using the framework of reciprocal vulnerability highlights 
possible mechanisms that lead to conflict.  
Weingast (1998) defines reciprocal vulnerability as the opportunity that each 
group in a state has to control the state apparatus and to subvert it for its own 
advancement at the expense of other groups (Weingast 1998). Under conditions of 
reciprocal vulnerability – where costs of victimhood are high and there are no 
institutionalized guarantees of protection – groups must assess the probability that 
others will initiate violence. If the assessed probability goes above a certain point (the 
point at which the expected costs of victimhood in the future outweigh the expected 
costs of fighting in the present), then the group will use violence preemptively. 
However, so long as the assessed probability is below this critical probability 
assessment, then no violence will occur (Weingast 1998). Mechanisms that come into 
focus under this framework are those that affect the level of assessed probability of 
victimhood and the critical probability assessment point.  That is to say, factors that 
increase a group’s feelings of vulnerability (i.e., increase the assessed probability of 
victimhood) increase the likelihood of the group engaging in preemptive violence. 




cooperation (i.e., lower the critical probability assessment point) also increase the 
likelihood of the group engaging in preemptive violence. 
 Although rationalist in orientation, the reciprocal vulnerability framework 
allows for institutions to play a crucial role in influencing the eruption and level of 
ethnic violence. Additionally, given its emphasis on threat perception in a group's 
probability assessment, it allows for theorization on the impact of ethnic extremism 
and ethnic nationalism, a lacuna found in other rationalist theories of ethnic rebellion. 
Furthermore, unlike some other rationalist theories of ethnic war (in particular, 
Posen's (1993) work on the ethnic security dilemma and Fearon's (1995a, 1995b) 
work on the bargaining theory of war), reciprocal vulnerability does not begin with 
anarchy or near-anarchy as an underlying assumption.
2
 In fact, reciprocal 
vulnerability highlights the importance of the state without assuming its neutrality.
3
 
At the same time, reciprocal vulnerability retains the focus on credible commitments 
as a driving factor in ethnic violence, a conceptual strength in the work of Posen and 
Fearon. Under conditions of reciprocal vulnerability, the ability of the state (and the 
groups which control it) to commit credibly to non-exploitation directly impacts 
minority groups' assessments of the likelihood of victimhood and hence directly the 
likelihood that minorities will engage in violence against the state.  
 Thus far, the discussion has focused on relations between a single ethnic 
minority and the state. Reciprocal vulnerability, however, also applies to relations 
                                                 
2
 This leaves the collapse of state institutions unexplained and unaccounted for. As de Figueiredo et al. 
(1999) point out, the collapse of the state is often coincident with ethnic violence and may be the cause 
or the product of ethnic conflict.  
 
3
 Paul Brass, in discussing the relationship(s) between the state and ethnic groups makes an excellent 





between ethnic groups. If the central state is weak and unable to regulate intergroup 
competition, this may heighten perceived vulnerabilities that lead to increased levels 
of conflict. Additionally, if the state favors one ethnic group over others this will 
increased perceived vulnerability, again leading to a higher probability of violent 
conflict occurring. (See Osaghae 2005 for a discussion of these dynamics in the 
African context.)  
 In using the reciprocal vulnerability framework, I will focus on four sets of 
factors that are hypothesized to influence the level of assessed probability of 
victimhood and the critical probability assessment point: conflictual histories; the 
nature of the democratic transition; institutional design; and uncertainty. In particular, 
I will focus on how these factors impact the ability of the state – and the groups that 
control it – to commit credibly to non-exploitation of minority ethnic groups. 
 I focus on these factors in order to explain the differences in group response to 
democratization attempts in post-Communist versus developing states, as groups in 
post-Communist states seem more prone to violent outcomes. While the difference 
may be explained by the dynamics of the transition itself, it may also be a result of 
factors not directly related to transition, per se. For example, different historical 
legacies of group-state relations may result in different group responses to 
democratization. Likewise, different institutional designs – while all democratic – 







There are a multitude of theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic conflict, 
including rationalist, culturalist, structuralist and psychological explanations. Table 
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Weingast’s theory of reciprocal vulnerability is generally placed in the 
rationalist camp. However, due to its emphasis on threat perception, it also shares 
much in common with psychological theories. Within the rationalist camp, one 
increasingly prominent theory is Fearon’s bargaining theory of war. Among 
psychological explanations, Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation is prominent. Most 
structural theories are rooted in Tilly’s ideas concerning collective mobilization.  
 Fearon (1995: 381) proposes three rationalist logics for why leaders choose 
war despite its risky and costly nature. First, he offers that leaders may have private 
information about capabilities or resolve while also having incentives to misrepresent 
that information. Second, credible commitment problems – situations where one or 
both actors have an incentive to defect from an agreement in the future – may prevent 
leaders from agreeing to an otherwise acceptable bargain. Third, although Fearon 
finds this problem less likely, issue indivisibilities may make negotiated solutions 
unattainable.  
 Much of the work testing Fearon’s theory has been in the realm of interstate 
conflict and bargaining. However, authors have also begun to apply his insights in the 
realm of internal conflict, including civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and ethnic 
secessionism (Walter 2006). 
 There is much in the bargaining theory of war that resonates with reciprocal 
vulnerability. Both situate ethnic actors and governments in a strategic setting, in 
which imperfect information, incentives to misrepresent capabilities and resolve, and 




model the primary goal of actors appears to be to achieve gains, for Weingast a much 
more important motivator is the desire to avoid losses.  
Charles Tilly (1978) outlines a theory of collective action based on the 
intersection of interests, organization and opportunity structures. Briefly, he proposes 
that shared advantages and/or disadvantages, common identities and unifying 
structures, availability of resources, and open opportunity structures lead to collective 
action (Tilly 1978: 54-56). Responding to the prominence of relative deprivation 
theorists, Tilly and colleagues argue that grievances are not enough to generate 
violence. Rather, opposition actors must be able to mobilize the resources in order to 
initiate and sustain collective action. Key determinants of actors’ ability to mobilize 
resources include state structure (such as, openness of the political system and levels 
of state repression), levels of economic development, and availability of both 
domestic and external coalition partners. While Weingast and other rationalists 
recognize that resources are an important component of the ability to rebel, they 
subsume considerations of resources into calculations of relative costs. 
 Ted Robert Gurr is the preeminent proponent of relative deprivation, defined 
as the “perceived discrepancy between men’s values expectations and their value 
capabilities” (Gurr, 1970: 13). In his seminal 1970 work, primary focus is indeed on 
the mechanisms that increase feelings of relative deprivation and how relative 
deprivation interacts with other variables (such as state coercion) to produce violent 
conflict. By the mid-1990s, however, Gurr had synthesized relative deprivation 
theory with elements of political process theory. Referring to processes of 




“The most basic assumption of the theory is that ethnopolitical activism is 
motivated by peoples’ deep-seated grievances about their collective status in 
combination with the situationally determined pursuits of political interests, as 
articulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs.” (Gurr, 1993: 123) 
Gurr’s application of relative deprivation to the field of ethnic conflict shares 
several characteristics with Weingast’s theory of reciprocal vulnerability. Both 
theories emphasize the role of perception in driving violent dynamics. For Gurr, it is 
the perception of deprivation more than an objective indicator of deprivation that is 
important. Similarly, in the theory of reciprocal vulnerability, it is a group’s 
perception or beliefs about the intention of the other and about the relative costs of 
exploitation that lead to preemptive violence. 
Despite the similarities, there are key differences. First, although Gurr speaks 
of fear of future losses, much of the analytic focus is on resentment over the past 
and/or current discrimination. Thus, the primary emotional drivers in relative 
deprivation are frustration and anger. This is quite different from situations of 
reciprocal vulnerability where the primary emotional driver seems to be fear. 
 
Hypotheses and Discussion 
The Effects of History 
Not all authoritarianism is equal. Some authoritarian states are relatively 
accommodative of ethnic minorities, while others are not. For example, systems of 
hegemonic exchange in Africa allowed ethnic groups some measure of cultural (if not 




measure of cultural accommodation. Other authoritarian states, however, actively 
suppress ethnic diversity and attempt forced assimilation of ethnic minorities. These 
different historical legacies may affect the ability of the state to commit credibly to 
non-exploitation in the present or future. 
Ethnic groups, as Lake and Rothchild (1996) note, view the future through the 
lens of the past. Groups, in part, will base their assessments of vulnerability on past 
interactions. Particularly in situations of uncertainty (such as during regime 
transitions), groups can be expected to rely on expectations and prior beliefs of the 
intentions of other groups (see Bendor 1993). Therefore, we should suspect that 
groups with conflictual histories with the state or with other groups within the state 
are more likely to mistrust the state. This may, in turn, lead to widespread perceptions 
of vulnerability within the group (Eidelson and Eidelson 2003). Heightened 
perceptions of vulnerability increase the risk of violence. Furthermore, under 
conditions of distrust, groups are less likely to receive at face value assurances of 
cooperation (Schul et al. 2004). 
 I test the effects of conflictual histories on the outbreak of ethnic rebellion 
using four indicators: past discrimination, past repression, history of lost autonomy, 
and presence of intergroup conflict. Groups that previously experienced 
discrimination are more likely to suspect the state’s neutrality and its ability to 
distribute fairly public goods to various ethnic actors within the state. Suspicion of the 
state’s neutrality causes the group’s assessed probability to increase, thus increasing 




Hypothesis 1: Ethnic groups that have experienced higher levels of economic 
or political discrimination in the past will exhibit higher levels of rebellion 
than those groups that have been subject to lower levels of economic or 
political discrimination. 
 Legacies of past repression may exacerbate perceptions of vulnerability in the 
present. Groups measure a state’s willingness and capacity to repress in part by 
reference to past repression. Repressive histories leave legacies of distrust and destroy 
more constructive channels of political communication. Repressive legacies also 
increase suspicion of the state's neutrality, which causes the group's assessed 
probability of victimhood to increase. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ethnic groups that have been subject to higher levels of 
repression in the past will exhibit higher levels of rebellion than those that 
have been subject to lower levels of repression. 
Groups that were previously autonomous but have lost the ability and right to 
rule themselves will also be more likely to distrust the state, especially since most 
historical incorporations of groups into state structures have been carried out 
coercively and without the consent of the group. 
Hypothesis 3: Ethnic groups that were historically autonomous but have been 
incorporated into a state will exhibit higher levels of rebellion than those that 
never enjoyed self-rule. 
Groups that have been involved in intergroup conflict are more likely to 
suspect the state’s neutrality. If the state is unable or unwilling to protect groups 




since the state is the most important safeguard against victimization by other groups 
in society.  
Hypothesis 4: Groups that have been involved in intergroup conflict in 
previous periods will exhibit higher levels of rebellion than groups that have 
not been involved in such conflict. 
 Ethnic violence is not inevitable if groups have conflictual histories. However, 
legacies of mistrust do necessitate stronger institutional designs to build credible 
commitments, an issue to which I will turn below.  
 
The Nature of Democratic Transitions 
The nature of the democratic transition experienced by groups may also affect 
their propensity to engage in violence against the state. Often, regime collapse leaves 
an institutional vacuum which approximates the context of anarchy. Collapse, 
therefore, greatly intensifies that security dilemma of ethnic groups. Especially in the 
context of pre-existing conflict or tensions, collapse may provide both an incentive 
and the political space in which ethnic violence may take place (see Bertrand 2004: 
178). Pacted transitions, transitions that are negotiated between the government and 
opposition forces, have lower levels of uncertainty. As changes are negotiated, 
institutional replacement tends to be more ordered and slower. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Ethnic groups in states attempting democratization 
following regime collapse will exhibit higher levels of rebellion than 




 The likelihood of pacted transitions experiencing ethnic rebellion is therefore 
largely dependent on the ethnic makeup of the parties negotiating the transition pact, 
as well as prior state-group relations, as discussed in a previous section, and 
institutional design, as discussed below. If ethnic groups do not participate in the 
negotiation of a transition, they are faced with higher levels of uncertainty about the 
probable outcomes of the transition. Furthermore, if ethnic groups are not involved in 
the negotiation of the transition, it is more likely that their particular security concerns 
will not be addressed. Finally, the exclusion (intentional or not) of ethnic minorities 
from the negotiation process in pacted transitions signals to ethnic minorities that they 
are, in fact, excludable. This signaling may cause groups to raise their estimation of 
the probability that they will be victimized, even under a more democratic regime. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Ethnic groups in states where the democratic opposition 
during transition is ethnically inclusive will exhibit lower levels of 
rebellion than ethnic groups in states where the democratic opposition 
is ethnically exclusive. 
 
Institutions to Build Credible Commitments 
Soltan et al. (1998: 3) argue, “Strategic cooperation depends on the existence 
of trust, credible commitments, and the elimination of antisocial options from 
consideration” – functions that the authors argue institutions may fulfill. Weingast 
(1998) focuses on how institutions that credibly commit the state and groups to 




 Different authors focus on various institutional arrangements that can mitigate 
problems of credible commitment. Walter (2002), studying the implementation phase 
of civil war settlements, focuses on various sorts of power-sharing pacts. Weingast 
(1998) focuses on the existence of mutual veto powers of various ethnic groups in 
society. Lake and Rothchild (1996) list a variety of institutional arrangements – 
including power-sharing, elections designed to produce group interdependence and 
federalism. 
 As with authoritarian regimes, not all democracies are the same. A variety of 
institutional arrangements meet democratic criteria. Democracies may be unitary or 
federal, presidential or parliamentary. However, not all institutional arrangements 
have equivalent impacts on assessments of group security. Nor are all democratic 
arrangements equally effective in building credible commitments in ethnically 
divided countries. 
 Falaschetti and Miller (2001) explicate a theoretical framework for 
understanding how institutional design may aid in creating credible commitments. 
They critique current theories of the state for assuming that external agents (e.g., 
Hobbes’ “Leviathan”) are non-opportunistic and non-strategic. If external agents (i.e., 
the state) are not constrained, then rational actors will not submit to them, hence 
forfeiting gains that are possible through cooperation. Falaschetti and Miller argue: 
While external agents are necessary for political economies to sustain 
efficient outcomes, they are not sufficient. Left unchecked, these 
agents possess an incentive that is inconsistent with the objective for 




redistribute any efficiency gains that they help to create (Falaschetti 
and Miller 2001: 396). 
 Drawing from theories of the firm, they demonstrate that diffuse (e.g., as 
opposed to unitary) external agents are more likely to be able to credibly commit to 
non-exploitation. If the external agent is in fact a “team” then team production 
problems inhibit the ability to pursue self-interest. If individual preferences within the 
external agent are sufficiently different, then the external agent cannot be “rational” 
in the sense of seeking its own interests. Thus, “rational, self-seeking individuals who 
have the incentive and capacity to play efficiency-retarding, opportunistic actions as 
unitary external agents may have neither when they comprise an external agent that is 
itself a team” (Falaschetti and Miller 2001: 402, emphasis in original). 
 Falaschetti and Miller (2001) point to multiple mechanisms for diffusing the 
functions of external agents, including division of powers between central and federal 
units and creating systems of checks and balances between various branches of the 
central government. However, they note that there are trade-offs to be made between 
securing credible commitments and the efficiency gains for which the external agent 
is created.  
While many of these institutions point to democracy as seemingly alleviating 
the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict, there are potential problems with democratic 
institutions. Elections may encourage ethnic outbidding by ethnic entrepreneurs who 
manipulate group fears to advance personal interests. Additionally, purely 
majoritarian electoral systems in social systems where the predominant means of 




(Welsh 1993). In such circumstances, where elections are more akin to censuses (see 
Horowitz 1985), electoral institutions may encourage violence on the part of 
minorities who foresee their permanent exclusion from political decision-making. 
However, Falaschetti and Miller’s argument can be modified to account for 
situations where ethnic identity is politicized and becomes a primary means of 
political mobilization. If we assume that preferences within ethnic groups are more 
uniform than preferences between ethnic groups, then the corollary to Falaschetti and 
Miller would be that political institutions should diffuse the functions of the external 
agent (i.e., the state) across ethnic groups.  
Falaschetti and Miller’s discussion highlights several mechanisms by which 
institutional design can help build credible commitments. Institutions that effectively 
tie the hands of the state, for example, can alleviate ethnic group fears. Likewise, 
institutions that distribute the functions of the state across multiple actors – especially 
multiple ethnic actors – should also facilitate the building of credible commitments. 
Finally, institutions that provide multiple entry points to and veto points within the 
political system for minorities should also facilitate credible commitments. 
Hypotheses below will focus on how certain institutional designs – in particular, 
federalisms, electoral design and the nature of the executive – fulfill these functions 
and aid in the creation of credible commitments. 
Federalism provides multiple entry points into the political system and has the 
potential to diffuse institutions across ethnic actors. Both multiple entry points for 
political access and dispersion of power across ethnic groups facilitate credible 




dispersion of groups and on the size of the federal units. Ethnofederalism, in which 
ethnic groups are given primary control over a federal unit, by definition, diffuses the 
power of institutions across ethnic groups. And even in primarily unitary states, 
ethnic groups that are granted some level of political autonomy are guaranteed 
institutional access.  The above discussion results in the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 7a: Ethnic groups in states characterized by federalism 
will exhibit lower levels of rebellion than groups in unitary systems. 
Hypothesis 7b: Ethnic groups in states characterized by 
ethnofederalism will exhibit lower levels of rebellion than groups in 
either federal or unitary states. 
Hypothesis 7c: Ethnic groups which have been granted autonomous 
powers in otherwise unitary states will exhibit lower levels of rebellion 
than groups in federal or unitary states, but will not show systematic 
differences from groups in states with ethnofederal structures. 
Proportional representation also has the potential to diffuse institutions across 
ethnic actors. Majoritarian electoral systems, however, have the potential to 
concentrate state institutions into the hands of a single ethnic group, decreasing the 
probability that commitments will be seen as credible and thus heightening the 
likelihood of violence. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: Ethnic group rebellion will be lower in states with 





The question of whether parliamentarism or presidentialism is more 
conducive to providing credible commitments depends largely on how such 
institutions are created. Presidential systems with strong executive privileges and 
weak legislatures are likely to heighten fears of institutional capture and thus lead to 
heightened probabilities of violent conflict. However, if presidential systems are 
characterized by a more even division of power between the executive and legislative 
branches, then presidential systems may serve as distributed external agents that 
provide credible commitments. Similarly, parliamentary systems under proportional 
electoral rules – which often result in coalition governments – are more likely to 
provide credible commitments than Westminster-style parliamentary systems in 
which one party can dominate. Thus, neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism 
necessarily results in a unitary or plural external agent. The effects of parliamentarism 
and presidentialism are dependent on how they interact with electoral systems and the 
constraints put on the executive by the division of powers. The following hypotheses 
result: 
Hypothesis 9: Neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism will be 
related systematically to higher levels of ethnic rebellion than the 
other. 
Hypothesis 10: Ethnic groups will exhibit lower levels of rebellion in 
states characterized by parliamentary systems combined with 





Hypothesis 11: Ethnic rebellion will be lower in presidential systems 
characterized by highly constrained executives than in presidential 
systems characterized by strong executives with broad powers. 
 
The Problem with Uncertainty 
Uncertainty can be classified in two ways. Strategic uncertainty exists when 
actors have incomplete information regarding the preferences and intentions of other 
actors. Analytic uncertainty exists when actors do not fully comprehend all the 
relevant causal mechanisms of the system in which they act, which means that actors 
may be uncertain of their payoffs even when the actions of all relevant actors are 
known. (For a more complete discussion of the differences and similarities between 
strategic and analytic uncertainty, see Iida 1993). 
 Both strategic and analytic uncertainty can affect ethnic group relations with 
the state. Under strategic uncertainty, groups are uncertain whether the state (and the 
group or groups that control it) is committed to mutual tolerance or not. Under 
analytic uncertainty, groups are uncertain of the actual outcomes of institutions. That 
is, they do not know if institutions will function as intended, e.g., if they will give 
minorities access to power and provide mutual veto points. Both types of uncertainty 
may increase the influence of extremist ethnic entrepreneurs. Under strategic 
uncertainty, where ethnic group members are uncertain of the intentions of the state 
and the ethnic group or groups that control it, ethnic entrepreneurs are more easily 
able to foster rumors and to deploy historical myths regarding the dangers of 




where it is unclear if institutional arrangements will in fact provide political access to 
minorities, ethnic extremists are again more able to convince kin of the necessity of 
preemptive violence.  
New states and young regimes exacerbate uncertainty in similar ways. Ethnic 
groups may be unsure of governments’ disposition to them in both contexts as 
interactions will probably have been limited. Both new states and young regimes may 
not have fully consolidated power, leaving uncertain their ability to control events or 
societal actors. Furthermore, rules and procedures – and their outcomes – may not be 
clearly established. 
 New states also are susceptible to dynamics not as common under regime 
change. The nature of national symbols (which often have ethnic significance), 
constitutional design, institutional structure, and citizenship are all open to debate in 
ways not generally present under regime change. Furthermore, the effects of such 
decisions are uncertain. 
Hypothesis 12: Ethnic groups in new states will exhibit higher levels 
of rebellion than groups in states established prior to democratization. 
Hypothesis 13: Ethnic groups in young regimes will exhibit higher 
levels of rebellion than ethnic groups in more established regimes. 
The methods and measurements used to test the above hypotheses (and, in 
turn, to test the extent to which Weingast’s theory of reciprocal vulnerability explains 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The Quantitative Study of Ethnic Conflict 
The quantitative study of ethnic conflict has expanded rapidly in the past 20 
years, much of it spurred by the availability of the Minorities at Risk project dataset. 
For example, since the MAR project released its first data, at least 64 articles 
employing some portion of the MAR data have appeared in peer-reviewed journals.  
In recent years, pooled cross-sectional time series have dominated large-N 
approaches to the study of ethnic conflict. The appeal of pooled cross-sectional time 
series is that researchers can explore the effects of variables that do not vary 
frequently within cases but show variation between cases and also attempt to capture 
time dynamics. However, the use of cross-sectional time series can pose 
methodological issues, if not modeled appropriately. In a series of articles, Nathaniel 
Beck and Jonathan Katz (1995, 1996) outline methods for dealing with times-series 
cross-section data that have since become canonical in political science. In particular, 
they recommend the use of panel-corrected standard errors to deal with 
heteroscedasticity and a lagged dependent variable to deal with serial correlation. 
However, recent debates warn against the blind acceptance of their advice.  
In the following sections, I will outline several methodological issues 
concerning times-series cross-section data. I will also introduce the data to be used in 




Methodological Conundrums and Potential Solutions 
Temporal Dependencies 
 All time-series data is likely to suffer from problems of serial correlation. 
After all, common sense indicates that the state of affairs in any given place at time t 
is likely to depend, at least in part, on the state of affairs in the same place at time t-1. 
There are several methods for dealing with temporal dependency in time-series cross-
section data. Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) advocate the use of a lagged dependent 
variable model (LDV), as opposed to methods such as using serial correlated errors. 
Although both methods may “fit” the data, Beck and Katz argue that using the lagged 
dependent variable will cause researchers to ponder model dynamics (Beck and Katz 
1996: 12).  
After a decade’s passage, Beck and Katz’s admonition has taken root. In a 
recent survey of 195 articles using time series methodologies, Wilson and Butler 
(2007) find that only a minority (although still 22.1%) of studies do not include 
dynamics, the vast majority with no justification. However, although many social 
science researchers have adopted Beck and Katz’s recommendation of LDV, the hope 
that researchers would ponder model dynamics has been woefully under-realized. 
Wilson and Butler (2007) found that only 26.7% of studies using LDV cited 
theoretical reasons. The majority cited it as a technical corrective for autocorrelation 
(69.3%) and/or as recommended by Beck and Katz (60.0%). Furthermore, only 
26.1% used or considered alternative dynamic specifications. Despite this blind use of 
LDV models, Wilson and Butler do find that the use of LDV is an appropriate option 




and Kelly (2006: 203) find that LDV provides estimates that are superior to other 
models, even in the presence of minor residual autocorrelation. 
Given the evidence that lagged dependent variable models are generally 
superior (or at least no worse than) other models, I will use a dependent variable with 




 In cross-sectional panel data, the issue of unit heterogeneity should be 
considered. That is, the units under analysis (here, ethnic groups) may differ in ways 
not necessarily explained by the independent variables. Local factors, which are 
either unobservable or too difficult or time-consuming to measure quantitatively, may 
impact the behavior (in this case, propensity to rebel) of the groups in question. The 
issue of unit heterogeneity is frequently overlooked in quantitative studies using 
cross-sectional, pooled time-series methodologies in comparative politics and 
international relations. According to a recent review of 195 such studies, only 77 
considered (even tangentially) unit heterogeneity (Wilson and Butler 2007: 9).  
 What are the possible impacts of not considering unit heterogeneity? The 
basic impact is similar to that of other types of omitted variable bias – a perennial 
problem in quantitative analysis. The researcher risks misinterpreting the effects of 
the independent variables of interest. Furthermore, without analyzing the panels 
separately, the researcher cannot know whether the pooled regression correctly 
estimates the slope, overestimates it, underestimates, or results in an incorrectly 




One potential corrective for unit heterogeneity is to employ fixed effects models, in 
which panels are allowed to have different intercepts. Fixed effects (FEM) models are 
unbiased, with known small-sample properties so long as some assumptions – to be 
discussed below – are met. 
 FEM models may be used as a diagnostic tool to determine if unit effects 
impact parameters of interest by comparing coefficients with those of OLS; and F-
tests can identify statistically significant unit effects by panel, by subset of data, or for 
the entire dataset (Butler and Wilson 2007). Furthermore, the analyst can easily 
identify which panels are most removed from the mean regression. Given that most 
statistical packages have routines for fixed effects models, why do researchers not 
employ them? One reason may be that FEM models cannot include time-invariant 
models, and slowly moving (“sluggish”) variables are likely to have high standard 
errors due to correlation with fixed effects (Wilson and Butler 2007). Since many of 
the variables of interest to political scientists (and included in my research as well) 
are static, this makes the use of FEM models problematic. Consider, most political 
institutions – for example, whether a country has a presidential or parliamentary 
system of government – are static for the time period being considered. Also, some 
properties of ethnic groups are relatively static (for example, the degree of cultural 
difference with the majority population in the state).  
 To take into account both the possibility of unit effects while still testing for 
the effects of time-invariant and sluggish variables, I will employ a three-step method 
– called fixed-effects vector decomposition – recently developed by Thomas Plümper 




effects estimate of the baseline model. Then, I will regress the resulting unit effects 
on the static and sluggish explanatory variables in my model, in order to identify the 
degree to which the unit effects are explained by these variables. Then, I will perform 
a pooled OLS estimation of my baseline model, including all explanatory variables of 
interest (time-variant, time-invariant and sluggish) plus the residuals of the unit 
effects regression (i.e., the unexplained part of the fixed effects vector).  
 
Selection Bias(es) 
 Simon Hug (2003) outlines several types of selection bias common in 
comparative political studies, including studies of ethnic conflict. He identifies three 
forms of selection bias. The first occurs when researchers sample on the dependent 
variable of interest. Political scientists, after being taken to task for more than 15 
years by authors such as Geddes (1990) and King et al. (1994), have made strides in 
avoiding this type of bias. 
 The other two types of bias are much more problematic, in that there may be 
little any researcher can do in order to avoid them: cases may select themselves into a 
population in a non-random manner; or a clear-cut population from which to draw a 
random sample may not exist. It is these two forms of bias that pose the most 
fundamental problems for studies of ethnic conflict. So, for example, it is likely that 
ethnic boundaries are formed and maintained (at least in part) by the very conflict 
processes that we wish to study (see, e.g., Jowitt 2001), leading to problems with 
endogeneity (see Christin and Hug 2003). Additionally, the fluid nature of ethnic 




boundaries may be situationally determined (see, e.g., Davydd 1985; Schlee 2002), 
nested (see, e.g., Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999), or strategically deployed (see, e.g., 
Elwert 2002; Brubaker 2004). Hug (2003) critiques the use of Minorities at Risk data 
primarily in these terms. However, given that selection criteria for ethnic group 
inclusion incorporate discrimination and political mobilization, there also are risks of 
endogeneity. 
 Hug suggests using a two-stage incidental truncation regression model to test 
for selection effects when using the Minorities at Risk dataset. Truncated regression 
models the selection mechanism into the incomplete data set together with an 
outcome equation modeling the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables of interest (see also Breen 1996).  
 Using Monte Carlo simulations, Hug (2003) finds that the truncated 
regression estimator outperforms the OLS estimator when sample sizes are small 
relative to the overall population size and when n>200 (see figure 1 in Hug 2003: 
263). However, there are tradeoffs as the truncated estimates tend to have inflated 
standard errors. 
 I will use Hug’s recommended method to test for selection effects in my 
models. However, given that my sample size is less than 200 (a situation in which 
Hug finds that the OLS estimator outperforms the truncated estimator), I will conduct 





Non-Interval Level Data 
 Strictly speaking, the primary indicator used to measure ethnic rebellion is not 
an interval level measure. Technically, regression techniques assume interval level 
data. However, since the late 1960s, social scientists and methodologists have made 
convincing arguments that ordinal level data may be used in regression techniques 
with little distortion of results. Labovitz (1967: 151) argues, “certain assumptions of 
both descriptive and inference statistics can be violated without unduly altering the 
conclusions; and strict adherence to measurement scales may lead to an extensive 
waste of information.” In two studies, Labovitz (1967, 1970) finds that there is little 
distortion in interpretation when ordinal scales are used in place of interval level data. 
The caveat, restated in Labovitz (1971), is that the amount of error present is 
inversely related to the number of ranks employed. Thus, it is often advisable not to 
use regression techniques meant for interval level data on dichotomous or 
trichotomous measures. 
 The first dependent variable to be examined in following chapters is an 
ordinal measure of ethnic group rebellion. However, as the number of ranks (8) is 
relatively high and as at least one study has found a high level of correlation between 
the ranked value and interval measures of rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2002), 
multivariate regression techniques may be used with a relatively high degree of 
confidence. 
 Changes in levels of ethnic rebellion, however, are trichotomous variables. In 
the case of ordinal data with few ranks, it is unadvisable to use parametric techniques. 




model both the grouped and longitudinal nature of the data, I will use an ordinal logit 
regression with clustering (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005:155). 
 
  
Presentation of Data 
Case Selection 
 The focus of this research is the behavior of ethnic groups in countries 
undergoing democratic transitions between 1980 and 2000. Countries were identified 
as having undergone a transition when the Polity score reached at least a 6 and 
maintained that level of democracy for at least one year. A Polity score of 6 is 
generally considered the minimum score for a full democracy. 
 Ethnic groups were defined based on their inclusion in the Minorities at Risk 
dataset. The Minorities at Risk project includes ethnic groups in countries with 
populations of at least 500,000 based on the following criteria: 
1. The ethnic group is subject to differential treatment vis-à-vis other groups 
in society; and/or 
2. The ethnic group is the focus of political mobilization; and 
3. The ethnic group has a population of at least 100,000 or 1% of the 
country’s population. 
Furthermore, the following practices are also followed in the selection and inclusion 
of ethnic groups: 
1. Data on any ethnic group is collected for each country for which it meets 




2. Ethnic groups are considered at the highest reasonable level of 
aggregation. 
3. Disadvantaged and advantaged minorities are included, as well as 
disadvantaged majorities or pluralities. However, advantaged majorities 
are not included. 
The above criteria yielded 59 ethnic groups in 27 countries in the developing 
world and 43 ethnic groups in 15 post-Communist states. (See Appendix A for 
complete list of cases.) 
Dependent Variables 
Several dependent variables are included in the quantitative analyses. First is 
the Minorities at Risk rebellion score. The rebellion variable is coded annually for all 
groups included in the dataset. It is scaled as follows: 0 (no rebellion); 1 (sporadic 
acts of terrorism); 2 (campaigns of terrorism); 3 (local rebellion); 4 (small-scale 
guerrilla warfare); 5 (intermediate-scale guerrilla warfare); 6 (large-scale guerrilla 
warfare); 7 (protracted civil war). Since the research questions at hand also deal with 
increases and decreases in ethnic rebellion – not just the absolute level of rebellion in 
a given year – dependent variables capturing increases and decreases are also 
included. Typically in times-series analysis, change in a particular variable is 
measured from one year to the next. However, the question of interest is not, for 
example, whether rebellion in year four after democratization is more than rebellion 
in year three after democratization. Rather, it is whether rebellion post-
democratization has increased from pre-democratization levels. To capture this, two 




year post-democratization is less than, the same as, or more than the highest level of 
rebellion exhibited in the five years prior to democratization. The second captures 
whether rebellion in each year post-democratization is less than, the same as, or more 
than the median level of rebellion for the five years prior to democratization. 
(Appendix B provides a complete description of all variables used in analysis and 
coding rules employed.) 
Independent Variables 
Historical Experiences 
To test hypotheses regarding the effects of conflictual histories on current 
levels of violence, I use five indicators. I employ two measures of discrimination: 
economic discrimination and political discrimination, taken from the MAR dataset 
(2005) and Asal’s (2003) extension. Variables for both economic and political 
discrimination range from 0 to 4, with a 4 indicating the highest level of exclusion. 
Data for three repression variables, based on the target (civilian, nonviolent political 
actors, violent political actors) of repression, were collected independently. 
Repression variables range from 0 to 5, with a 5 indicating that the state used lethal 
force at least once during the year being coded. Additionally, the MAR dataset 
includes an index of lost autonomy.
1
 This index takes into account when the group in 
question lost autonomy, giving more weight to autonomy lost more recently. It also 
takes into account the degree of autonomy that was lost. It ranges in value from 0 to 6 
                                                 
1
 The Minorities at Risk lost autonomy variables were refined, updated and corrected by David Quinn. 
Although they have not yet been released to the general public, David Quinn graciously provided them 




Finally, I include a scaled measure of intercommunal conflict. Taken from the 
MAR dataset (2005), this variable codes the most severe manifestation of 
intercommunal conflict for each decade from the 1940s through the 1980s. 
The Nature of the Democratic Transition 
Measures of the type of democratic transition and the composition of 
democratization forces were collected independently. Type of democratic transition 
(rupture or pacted) is a dichotomous measure. A democratic rupture is a transition led 
from below in which the authoritarian state is overwhelmed by opposition and is 
unable to influence directly the outcome of the transition. The paradigmatic case is 
Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations," in which junior military officers led a 
leftist coup that led to democratization. (See O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and 
Stepan 1996). Pacted transitions are characterized by an "explicit, but not always 
publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to 
define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of 
mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it." (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986:37) The paradigmatic case is the Spanish transition following 
Franco's death, in which reformists within the regime negotiated the rules of the 
transition with members of the democratic opposition. I categorize democratic 
transitions as ruptures or pacted based on available case information and country 
summaries from the Polity IV dataset. 
Ethnic minorities can play different roles during democratization. Sometimes, 
ethnic minorities are at the forefront of forces pushing for democratization; other 




ethnic actors (generally those which have been privileged minorities) are part of anti-
democracy movements. I categorize ethnic involvement in democratization as 
follows: group is involved in anti-democratic countermovements; group is not 
involved in either anti- or pro-democracy movements (or is involved in both); 
individual members of the ethnic group are involved in pro-democracy movements; 
ethnic group organizations are involved in pro-democracy coalitions; and ethnic 
group organizations lead the pro-democracy forces. 
 
Measuring Institutions 
To test institutional hypotheses, four measures taken from Saideman et al. 
(2002), two additional measures developed from it and Polity IV (2002), and two 
measures independently coded are employed. The federal system variable is a 
dichotomous variable, with federal systems taking the value of 1. This variable does 
not take into account whether or not the federalism has an ethnic character to it – as is 
the case in Russia, India, and Ethiopia, for example. Therefore, it can only be used to 
determine the efficacy of decentralization in ameliorating ethnic conflict – but cannot 
be used to speak to the debate on the efficacy of federalism set up along ethnic lines.  
Therefore, I include two additional measures which were independently coded. A 
measure of ethnofederalism is a dichotomous indicator of whether a group controls a 
federal unit. A measure of ethnic autonomy indicates whether a group has been 
granted some level of political and territorial autonomy within an otherwise unitary 




exclusive; that is to say, an ethnic group may be coded as a 1 under only one of these 
variables at a time. 
I also include several control variables in determining the effects of various 
types of decentralization. While federal states differ from ethnofederal states in that 
ethnic groups are not explicitly recognized as “owners” of federal units, if an ethnic 
group is the largest group in a federal unit, it can proxy the effects of ethnofederalism. 
Therefore, I also include a dichotomous measure indicating if the ethnic group is the 
plurality or majority population of a federal unit not otherwise recognized as 
ethnofederal. On the other hand, in ethnofederal states or in autonomous zones for 
ethnic minorities, the presence of a significant portion of the minority population 
outside the region the group controls may offset any beneficial effect of 
ethnofederalism or autonomy. Therefore, I also include dichotomous indicators of 
whether more than 25% or more of the minority population lives outside an 
ethnofederal unit or autonomous zone. 
An ordinal variable indicates whether a state’s electoral system is 
proportional, semi-proportional, plurality or majoritarian. It is taken from the 
Saideman et al. (2002) replication dataset. 
I employ four variables in an attempt to disentangle the effects of 
parliamentary versus presidential systems. First, I use a dichotomous measure to 
indicate parliamentary systems, with presidential systems taking a null value. Second, 
I interact this variable with the variable for minimal democracies employing 
proportional electoral systems. This is to measure the effects of having a 




the dichotomous measure (so that presidential systems take the value of 1) and 
interact it with the executive constraints measure taken from Polity IV (2002). The 
executive constraints measure takes a value from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating the highest 
level of constraint on executive decision-making (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). I also 
interact this variable with the competitive executive recruitment measure from Polity 
IV (2002). This measure ranges from 1 to 3, with 3 indicating the highest level of 
competition in executive recruitment. Both structural, legal constraints on decision-
making and competition may serve as different types of constraint on executive 
authority, so both are considered as measures of such. 
Indicators for Uncertainty 
I use two variables to capture institutional sources of uncertainty. Regime age 
measures the age in years of the political/constitutional order of the state and is 
derived from the Polity IV (2002) durability measure. State age measures how long 
the state has been independent. 
Control Variables 
I also include in my analysis several control variables, most of which attempt 
to capture the capabilities of states and ethnic groups. As Falaschetti and Miller 
(2001) aptly point out, it is costly to diffuse institutions and requires more resources 
than centralizing political institutions. To control for the ability of states to construct 
institutions which accommodate ethnic minorities, I use GDP per capita and change 
in GDP per capita, taken from World Bank (2006). These indicators are also proxies 




I also include variables from the MAR dataset to control for ethnic group 
capacity. As Lischer (1999) points out, even if ethnic groups fear for their survival, to 
use preemptive violence requires some level of organization and resources. Group 
organization for joint political action measures the most militant form of organization 
used by the group. This variable helps capture an ethnic group’s organizational 
capacity to engage in violence against the state. Number of kindred segments 
measures the presence of kindred groups in adjoining countries. Kindred groups in 
neighboring countries represent one important source for resources.  
I also control for the degree of cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minorities. I 
use the cultural categoriness measure in the MAR dataset as my measure of cultural 
distinctiveness. This variable measures the number of dimensions (linguistic, 
religious, racial and customary) on which the minority is different from the majority 
while also accounting for the cultural cohesion of that minority. Finally, I control for 
the geographic dispersion of the ethnic group. Certain policy interventions (such as 
federalism) may be more effective when groups are geographically concentrated, 
whereas other (such as proportional electoral systems) may be less important when 
groups are concentrated. The geographic concentration variable ranges from 0 for the 
most dispersed groups to 3 for groups that are the most concentrated.  





Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses with Indicators 
Hypothesis Indicators Hypothesized 
relationship  
H1 Past economic or political 
discrimination increases levels of 
rebellion 
POLDIS, ECDIS + 






H3 Lost autonomy increases levels of 
rebellion 
AUTLOST + 
H4 Past intercommunal conflict increases 
levels of rebellion 
COMCON + 
H5 Democratization through rupture 
increases levels of rebellion 
TRANSITION + 
H6 Inclusion in democratic opposition 
decreases levels of rebellion 
ETHNICTRANS - 
H7a Federalism decreases rebellion FEDERAL - 
H7b Ethnofederalism decreases rebellion ETHFED - 
H7c Autonomy decreases rebellion AUTONOMY - 
H8 Proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
ELECTORAL - 
H9 Neither parliamentarism or 
presidentialism are correlated with 
rebellion 
PARLIAMENTARY - 
H10 Parliamentary systems with 
proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
PARLELECT - 
H11 Presidential systems with constrained 




H12 Young states have higher levels of 
rebellion 
STATEAGE + 






Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis: Levels of Ethnic Rebellion 
 
Summary Characteristics of Data 
The dependent variable of interest in this section of the study is the absolute 
level of rebellion employed by an ethnic group. Figure 4.1 gives a breakdown of the 
number of group-years at each level of rebellion, as measured by the REB variable in 
the Minorities at Risk project. As is evident from the figure, the presence of group 
rebellion at any level is relatively uncommon.  
Figure 4.1 Levels of ethnic rebellion (group-years) 
 
Table 4.1 further breaks down the distribution of group-years of rebellion by 


























Developing States Post-Communist States 
None 244 214 














Civil war 9 1 
 
Ethnic groups in developing countries transitioning to democracy exhibit more 
variation in the overall level of rebellion than groups residing in post-Communist 
states undergoing democratization. They also exhibit higher levels of ethnic rebellion, 
with more than 12 percent of group-years experiencing at least small-scale guerrilla 
warfare. This contrasts with the post-Communist world, in which just over 1 percent 
of group-years experience any level of guerrilla warfare. 
 While the above table and figure give an idea of the distribution of rebellion 
across categories, they do not give a sense of the distribution of rebellion across time 
or across ethnic groups. Appendix C, therefore, contains time plots by ethnic group, 
divided into the developing and post-Communist subsamples. 
 In this chapter, I use several longitudinal methods to determine the relative 
effects of independent variables on levels of ethnic conflict in both the overall sample 
and in the sub-samples from the developing and post-Communist worlds. However, 




the presence of selection bias. Then, I conduct two analyses – linear regression with 
panel-corrected standard errors and fixed-effects vector decomposition – on the entire 
set of cases. Multiple statistical methods are used to test the robustness of results. An 
indicator for whether a group resides in a post-Communist state is included in order to 
test if the differences in levels of ethnic rebellion in the post-Communist versus the 
developing world observed by other researchers can be explained primarily by 
differences in the levels of other independent variables. As will be shown below, the 
indicator for post-Communism is significant. Therefore, in order to analyze further 
the differences between ethnic groups in post-Communist countries and those in 
developing countries, I conduct analyses using the same statistical models but 
splitting the sample into the two sub-samples. 
Analysis 1: Establishing if Selection Bias is Present 
 In this analysis, an incidental truncation model is used to establish if selection 
bias is present. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Minorities at Risk dataset has been 
criticized as biased in its selection of cases (see discussion in Chapter 3). The 
incidental truncation model uses simulation to test for the presence and degree of 
selection bias in the data (see Hug 2003). Despite its usefulness, incidental truncation 
models are limited to cross-sectional data and are not able to model times-series data 
such as used in this study. Therefore, although the technique will give some 
indication of the presence or absence of selection bias, the coefficients cannot be 
interpreted.  
 Table 4.2 shows the results from two models. The first is the regular ordinary 




incidental truncation model. The second model is the incidental truncation model. 
The variables used for the selection equation were chosen because of their 
relationship to selection criteria for both the MAR project and for this study. So, both 
political and economic discrimination are criteria by which ethnic groups are selected 
into the MAR database. The variable for protest is included since it is a prominent 
measure of minority group mobilization, another selection criterion for MAR. 
Cultural differentials were included since MAR only includes groups that are in some 
way culturally distinct from dominant groups. The Polity score was included because 
of this study’s focus on democratizing countries. Finally, group concentration and 
history of lost autonomy were included because it is expected that these two factors 
increase the likelihood that scholars and others will “notice” a minority. 
Table 4.2 Incidental Truncation Compared to Ordinary Regression
1
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Rebellion  
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 The incidental truncation model would not converge when separate variables denoting different types 
of decentralization (federalism, ethnofederalism, and autonomy) were included in the model. 
Therefore, a collapsed indicator was created. Decentralization is scored 1 if federalism or 
ethnofederalism or autonomy is scored 1 and is 0 otherwise. Variables capturing if a significant 
minority of the ethnic group is outside a territorial unit under the group’s control also were dropped 
from the model so that the incidental truncation model would converge. Additionally, to reach 





Selection Equation   
Political discrimination -- -.048 
(.709E+18) 
Economic discrimination -- -.049 
(.715E+18) 
Polity -- -.042 
(.609E+18) 
Lost autonomy -- .032 
(.462E+18) 
Protest -- -.012 
(.176E+18) 
Group concentration -- -.031 
(-.031E+18) 
Cultural differentials -- -.009 
(.129E+18) 
Constant -- 42.413 
(.622E+18) 
 
As can be seen from the above table, it is unlikely that selection bias is a problem for 
analysis. None of the variables in the selection equation reach significance. Therefore, 
the coefficients are the same in the incidental truncation model as they are in the 
regular regression model, although the standard errors are different. The results from 
this comparison mean the following analyses can be viewed with confidence that 
selection bias is not affecting their results. 
Analysis 2: Pooled Sample 
Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
The standard method for analyzing cross-section times-series data has become 
linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors.
3
 As a baseline model, I use 
times-series regression with a lagged dependent variable and panel-corrected standard 
                                                 
3




errors for the entire sample (cases from both post-Communist and developing 
countries).
4
 Results are shown in Table 4.3.  
                                                 
4
 The complete list of cases is included in Appendix A. Briefly, ethnic groups in post-Communist 
countries include those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ethnic groups in developing 









Lag of dependent 
variable 
Rebellion  
(lagged one year) 
.749*** 
(.087) 
Economic Discrimination .052 
(.037) 
Political Discrimination .053 
(.035) 
Repression -- civilians  
(lagged one year) 
-.003  
(.038) 




Repression --violent actors  
(lagged one year) 
.008 
(.039) 




Communal conflict .089*** 
(.023) 
Federal state -.019 
(.106) 
Majority in federal unit -.115 
(.121) 
Ethnofederalism  -.144 
(.228) 




Autonomous region -.500 
(.305) 




Electoral system .012 
(.034) 










Presidential system -- 



































 Constant -.010  
(.222) 
+
p<.1  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Dependent variable is rebellion score 
N = 417 (80 groups) 
R
2
 = .81 
 
In addition to the results given in the above table, several variables were tested for 
joint significance. So, for example, a group having the majority population in a 
federal unit; the central state designating a federal unit as being the “home” territory 
of a specific ethnic group (i.e., ethnofederalism); and the state granting autonomy to 
the ethnic group may be functionally equivalent (although they are mutually 
exclusive in the coding). That is, each of these policies represents a form of 
decentralization in which the ethnic minority has increased control over its own 
affairs. Therefore, it is important to test these variables together. I performed Wald F-




significant at the .1 level and have an ameliorative effect on levels of ethnic conflict. 
Additionally, political and economic discrimination are jointly significant at the .01 
level and increase levels of ethnic conflict. Finally, the presence of a constrained 
executive and the presence of competitive executive recruitment in presidential 
systems are jointly significant at the .05 level and lower levels of ethnic rebellion.  
Not jointly significant are the type of transition and the involvement of the ethnic 
group in the transition process; nor is any combination of repression measures 
significantly associated with levels of rebellion. 
 Within this model, conflict and institutional variables are the most 
consistently significant. Among conflict indicators, all except the repression variables 
are either individually or jointly significant. Economic and political discrimination 
are not individually significant; however the combined effect is significant, with the 
coefficient in the expected direction. The substantive effect, however, is small. The 
highest coded level of both political and economic discrimination is associated with 
an increase of only .42 in the rebellion score in this model. A history of lost autonomy 
has a greater substantive effect than political and economic discrimination combined. 
The highest coded level of lost autonomy is associated with an increase of .465 in the 
rebellion score. Finally, the presence of intercommunal conflict also has a moderate 
effect on the level of ethnic conflict. The highest coded level of intercommunal 
conflict is associated with an increase in the rebellion score of .53. This result is 
highly statistically significant, although this indicator does not take into account the 
relationship between the group antagonist and the state, nor does it take into account 




Several of the institutional variables are also significant. All forms of 
decentralization reduce levels of ethnic rebellion, and they reach significance when 
taken jointly. However, according to this analysis, not all forms of decentralization 
are equally effective. Autonomy – in many cases a more extreme form of 
decentralization than federalism or ethnofederalism – has four to five times the effect 
as the other forms of decentralization included. Parliamentarism, alone or when 
combined with proportional representation, does not reach statistical significance. 
However, constraints posed by competitive executive recruitment in a presidential 
system have a moderate effect that is statistically significant. The most competitive 
forms of executive recruitment are associated with a .59 decrease in levels of ethnic 
rebellion. 
Indicators of uncertainty are the most weakly related to levels of 
organizational rebellion. Only transition type (pacted or rupture) is marginally 
significant, with ruptures (as hypothesized) associated with higher levels of rebellion. 
However, the substantive impact is small. I will now turn to supplementary analyses 
to test the robustness of these results. 
 
 Testing for Local Effects – Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition 
In Chapter 3, several common issues with longitudinal, cross-sectional data 
were discussed. Prominent among these is the problem of unit heterogeneity, which 
can be summarized as the problem of local effects. Fixed effects models allow for 
different units of analysis to take different intercepts, controlling for local factors that 




previously, fixed effects models do not allow for the inclusion of static variables and 
the standard errors of slowly changing variables tend to be greatly inflated. This 
obviously poses a problem for much political analysis, since political institutions tend 
to be either static or slowly changing. Therefore, I use fixed-effects vector 
decomposition (FEVD), developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007). In this method, 
the baseline model minus static and sluggish variables is run with fixed effects. The 
resulting fixed effects are then regressed on the static and slowly changing variables. 
Finally, OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors is used, with the 
inclusion of static and slowly changing variables and the residuals of the fixed effects. 
Table 4.4 gives the results of this final stage in the process. (Results from the first two 










Lag of dependent 
variable 
Rebellion  
(lagged one year) 
.749*** 
(.091) 
Economic Discrimination .067 
(.042) 
Political Discrimination .026 
(.038) 
Repression -- civilians  
(lagged one year) 
.011  
(.032) 




Repression --violent actors  









Communal conflict .100*** 
(.027) 
Federal state -.013 
(.098) 
Majority in federal unit -.103 
(.134) 
Ethnofederalism  -.115 
(.117) 




Autonomous region -.468* 
(.239) 





Electoral system .041 
(.033) 










Presidential system -- 
competitive executive recruitment 
-.043* 
(.020) 
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Transition type .157 
(.170) 








Regime age .020  
(.027) 




Group concentration .010 
(.017) 












Fixed effects residuals 3.65 
(2.91) 
 Constant -.0418  
(.303) 
+
 p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Dependent variable is rebellion score 
N = 408 (78groups) 
R
2
 = .81 
 
As in the previous analysis, several variables were tested for joint significance. 
Having a majority in a federal unit, ethnofederalism and autonomy are jointly 
significant at the .05 level and have an ameliorative effect on levels of ethnic conflict. 
Additionally, political and economic discrimination are jointly significant at the .001 
level and increase levels of ethnic conflict. The presence of a constrained executive 




significant; nor are the type of transition and the involvement of the ethnic group in 
the transition process. Additionally, no combination of repression measures is 
statistically significant. 
 The results from this analysis are quite similar to the results from the regular 
regression with panel-corrected standard errors performed earlier.  The joint 
significance of political and economic discrimination increases in the FEVD, with the 
substantive impact of economic discrimination increasing slightly, while the 
substantive impact of political discrimination is halved.  
 The impact of lost autonomy is only slightly different, although the statistical 
significance decreases. However, the joint significance of forms of decentralization in 
the FEVD model increases, although the substantive impact is virtually unchanged. 
Finally, the presence of a constrained executive and of competitive executive 
recruitment are not jointly significant in the FEVD model. 
 Finally, it should be noted that the coefficient for fixed effects residuals (that 
part unexplained by the included static and sluggish variables) is not statistically 
significant. This bolsters confidence that local factors are not systematically 
influencing levels of ethnic rebellion significantly. 
 
Comparison and Discussion 
 Several of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 are supported by the 
analyses above. Both the regression with panel-corrected standard errors and with 
fixed-effects vector decomposition support the hypothesis that past economic and 




substantive impact is relatively small. Furthermore, both analyses support hypotheses 
regarding the impact of lost autonomy and of communal conflict on levels of ethnic 
rebellion. However, again, the substantive impact of these factors appears to be 
relatively small. Neither analysis supports hypotheses regarding the impact of 
repression on absolute levels of ethnic conflict. 
Hypotheses regarding the impact of transition type and ethnic group 
involvement in the transition are not supported in general, although there is weak 
support for the impact of transitional ruptures in the regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors. 
 The effects of institutions are fairly consistent across method of analysis. 
Hypotheses regarding the effects of decentralization and giving ethnic minorities 
political control of territory (whether through federalism, ethnic federalism or 
autonomy) are supported. Furthermore, the relative impacts of these variables – 
especially autonomy – are larger than in the case of most of the conflict variables. 
However, there is a caveat to this finding. Excluding large minorities of the ethnic 
population from the territorial unit in which the ethnic group dominates essentially 
nullifies the positive effects of such institutions. This is a finding that requires further 
exploration and has significant policy implications. It also has the potential to help 
explain some of the discrepancies in findings on the impact of decentralization in 
different regions. This analysis is perhaps the first to control for the geographic 
dispersion of the group outside such territorial units when determining their effects on 




 As expected, neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism are consistently 
associated with higher or lower levels of ethnic rebellion. However, there is some 
limited support in both analyses for hypotheses regarding the impact of constrained 
executive systems, though the substantive impacts are small. 
 None of the hypotheses regarding the impact of uncertainty (as measured by 
state age or regime age) are supported in analyses. 










H1 Past economic or political discrimination 
increases levels of rebellion 
Supported Supported 
H2 Past repression increases levels of rebellion Not supported Not supported 
H3 Lost autonomy increases levels of rebellion Supported Weakly 
Supported 
H4 Past intercommunal conflict increases levels 
of rebellion 
Supported Supported 
H5 Democratization through rupture increases 




H6 Inclusion in democratic opposition 
decreases levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H7a Federalism decreases rebellion (and group 
majority in federal unit) 
Supported Supported 
H7b Ethnofederalism decreases rebellion (jointly 
significant with other forms of 
decentralization) 
Supported Supported 
H7c Autonomy decreases rebellion Supported Supported 
H8 Proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H9 Neither parliamentarism or presidentialism 
are correlated with rebellion 
Supported Supported 
H10 Parliamentary systems with proportional 
electoral rules decrease rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H11 Presidential systems with constrained 





H12 Young states have higher levels of rebellion Not supported Not supported 
H13 Young regimes have higher levels of 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
 
 Of the control variables used in the analyses, only one was significant in both: 
the dichotomous indicator for groups in post-Communist countries was significant 
with a relatively large substantive impact. In order to further explore differences 
between ethnic groups in post-Communist and developing countries, analysis was 




Analysis 3: Comparison of Post-Communist Sample with Developing Countries 
Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
 As with the entire sample, regression with a lagged dependent variable and 
panel-corrected standard errors was employed to test the effects of the independent 
variables on the absolute level of ethnic rebellion. One regression tested the effects of 
the independent variables on rebellion by ethnic groups from post-Communist 
countries, while a second analysis was employed using the sample of ethnic groups 
from developing countries. Table 4.6 reports the results of these analyses, presented 




Table 4.6 Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, by Sub-Sample 

























Repression -- civilians  





Repression -- nonviolent actors 
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 p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Dependent variable is rebellion score 
N = 158, 34 groups (post-Communist sample); N = 259, 46 groups (developing sample) 
R
2
 = .79 (post-Communist sample); R
2
 = .83 (developing sample) 
 
Once again, several combinations of variables were also tested for 
significance. In the post-Communist sample, economic and political discrimination 
are jointly significant at the .01 level – not surprising since political discrimination is 
significant at the .001 level – and increase levels of ethnic conflict. Having control of 
a federal unit, ethnofederalism and autonomy are jointly significant at the .05 level 
and are associated with lower levels of ethnic rebellion. No other combinations of 
variables reach significance. 
 In the developing sample, political and economic discrimination are jointly 
significant at the .05 level, resulting in higher levels of ethnic conflict. Having control 




level and result in lower levels of ethnic conflict. No other combinations of variables 
reach significance. 
 There are several notable differences between the impacts of the independent 
variables on ethnic group rebellion in post-Communist versus developing countries. 
In post-Communist states, political discrimination has nearly double the effect and is 
more highly significant than in developing states. Intercommunal conflict has an 
almost 50 percent greater impact in the post-Communist region than it does in 
developing countries. This again raises the question, discussed briefly in Chapter 2, 
on the effects of conflict with more powerful versus less powerful groups. Is it the 
type and/or status of ethnic groups involved in intercommunal conflict in the post-
Communist region that leads to that variable having a greater impact there than in the 
developing world? That is one area which deserves more thorough exploration in 
future work. 
A history of lost autonomy has three times the effect in the developing sample 
as compared to the post-Communist significant, and is significant in the former but 
not in the latter. This is an interesting finding, since it would be expected that 
histories of lost autonomy would be more directly related to separatist rebellions as 
opposed to rebellion for control of or access to the existing state. Separatist rebellions 
have been far more prevalent, as a percentage of conflicts, in the post-Communist 
context than in developing countries. Furthermore, the average level of lost autonomy 
for post-Communist groups is higher than that for groups in the developing world. 
One partial explanation may rest in the use of decentralized forms of governance in 




the post-Communist region, 43.5 percent have some form of decentralized 
governance structures for their benefit, most commonly an ethnofederal unit. Among 
groups that have histories of lost autonomy in developing countries, a mere 18.4 
percent experience a decentralized form of governance. That being said, having 
control of a federal unit has the opposite effect for group rebellion in developing 
states than in post-Communist states, where it is associated with higher levels of 
rebellion; additionally, autonomy has a much larger impact in post-Communist states 
than in developing states, although in both sub-samples autonomy is associated with 
lower levels of ethnic rebellion. There is a similar split between the two regions in the 
effects of the governmental system, with parliamentary systems having a larger 
impact in the developing sample while presidential systems with constrained 
executives have a larger impact in the post-Communist sample. 
 A slightly different profile of supported hypotheses emerges from analyzing 
the samples separately than from the analysis of the combined samples. Among the 
conflict variables, the most consistently supported hypotheses are on the impact of 
past discrimination and intercommunal conflict. The impact of past discrimination 
holds for all three analyses (full sample, post-Communist sub-sample, developing 
sub-sample), but holds more strongly for political than for economic discrimination 
and for the post-Communist region. Even more consistently, the impact of communal 
conflict is seen in all three analyses, reaching statistical significance in each. The 
three hypotheses regarding the impact of decentralization (federalism, 
ethnofederalism and autonomy) are also consistently supported across analyses, 




There are also several hypotheses that are consistently refuted across analyses. 
In all three analyses, repression (regardless of what type of actor it is levied against) 
does not have an impact on the absolute level of rebellion. Ethnic group involvement 
in (or opposition to) the democratic transition also does not have a significant impact 
on levels of ethnic rebellion post-democratization. Hypotheses regarding the impact 
of young states and young regimes are also not supported. In fact, in the post-
Communist sample, ethnic groups in older states have higher levels of rebellion than 
ethnic groups in younger states, the opposite effect from what was hypothesized. 
Proportional electoral rules also do not seem to lower levels of ethnic rebellion.  
Other hypotheses receive mixed support, depending on the sample analyzed. 
The impact of lost autonomy is seen in groups in developing states (and carries into 
the full sample), but not in the post-Communist sample. Given that more groups in 
the post-Communist region are living in states noted for renewed nationalism (see, 
e.g., Brubaker 1996), this finding is somewhat surprising. Transitions through rupture 
are shown to increase ethnic rebellion in the developing sample (and the effect carries 
through to the combined analysis), but not in the post-Communist sample. 
Parliamentarism has a significant effect on decreasing ethnic rebellion in the 
developing sample, an effect that does not carry over to the combined sample and is 
opposite of the effect (not statistically significant) in the post-Communist region. 
Finally, the impact of governmental system is split by sub-sample. In the developing 
region, parliamentarism combined with more highly proportional electoral rules is 
associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion, an effect opposite from what was 




constrained executives are also associated with higher levels of rebellion, an effect 
also not expected. Table 4.7 summarizes the hypotheses supported by analysis of the 
post-Communist and developing worlds. 




H1 Past economic or political discrimination 
increases levels of rebellion 
Supported Weakly 
supported 
H2 Past repression increases levels of rebellion Not supported Not supported 
H3 Lost autonomy increases levels of rebellion Not supported Weakly 
supported 
H4 Past intercommunal conflict increases levels 
of rebellion 
Supported Supported 
H5 Democratization through rupture increases 
levels of rebellion 
Not supported Weakly 
supported 
H6 Inclusion in democratic opposition decreases 
levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H7a Federalism decreases rebellion (and group 
majority in federal unit) 
Not supported Weakly 
supported 
H7b Ethnofederalism decreases rebellion (jointly 
significant with other forms of 
decentralization) 
Supported Supported 
H7c Autonomy decreases rebellion Supported Not supported 
H8 Proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H9 Neither parliamentarism or presidentialism 
are correlated with rebellion 
Supported Not supported 
H10 Parliamentary systems with proportional 
electoral rules decrease rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H11 Presidential systems with constrained 
executives decrease rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H12 Young states have higher levels of rebellion Not supported Not supported 
H13 Young regimes have higher levels of 
rebellion 





Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition 
 As with the entire sample, fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) was 
used to test for the effects of unit heterogeneity within the post-Communist and 
developing country samples. Table 4.8 gives the results for the final stage of this 
process. (Results for the first two steps of fixed-effects vector decomposition are 




Table 4.8 Results for Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition, by Sub-Sample 
Post-
Communist 





Lag of dependent 
variable 
Rebellion  
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 p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
Dependent variable is rebellion score 
N = 149, 32 groups (post-Communist sample); N = 253, 45 groups (developing sample) 
R
2
 = .83 (post-Communist sample); R
2
 = .83(developing sample) 
 
 Tests were also conducted for joint significance within both the post-
Communist and developing states sample. In the post-Communist sample, political 
and economic discrimination, which increase ethnic rebellion, are jointly significant 
at the .001 level. The type of transition and ethnic group involvement in the 
democratic transition are jointly significant at the .05 level. Lagged values for 
repression against the civilian population and repression against nonviolent actors are 
jointly significant at the .05 level, while repression against the general civilian 




repression against nonviolent and violent actors is significant at the .01 level. The 
three repression variables tested jointly are significant at the .05 level. Finally, 
minority control of a federal unit, ethnofederalism and autonomy are jointly 
significant at the .01 level. No other combinations reach significance. 
 In the sample of ethnic groups from developing countries, economic and 
political discrimination are jointly significant at the .05 level. Minority control of a 
federal unit, ethnofederalism and autonomy are significant at the .05 level. No other 
combination of variables reached statistical significance. 
 The results for the fixed-effects vector decomposition for the sample of ethnic 
groups in developing countries are not significantly different from the results from the 
standard regression with panel-corrected standard errors for the developing sample or 
from the results for the fixed-effects vector decomposition for the combined sample. 
However, the results from the post-Communist sample differ from both the results 
from the combined sample fixed-effects vector decomposition and from the 
regression with panel-corrected standard errors for the post-Communist sample. 
Discrimination – in particular political discrimination – continues to be a significant 
factor linked to increased levels of ethnic rebellion. Additionally, repression emerges 
as significant, with repression against nonviolent political actors decreasing levels of 
ethnic rebellion and repression against violent actors increasing ethnic rebellion. 
While the first result does not conform to the expectations, the second does confirm 
the hypothesis – and runs counter to theories that expect a displacement effect of 
repression. That is, these findings contradict theorists who expect repression of 




actors to result in increased reliance on nonviolence. A history of lost autonomy is 
also not significantly associated with increased levels of ethnic rebellion. 
Furthermore, intercommunal conflict loses significance in this analysis.  
 Another finding is that ethnofederalism is significantly associated with 
increased levels of ethnic rebellion while autonomy is associated with decreased 
levels of ethnic rebellion within the post-Communist region. This finding contradicts 
expectations, although it also confirms other studies that find troublesome the 
legacies of ethnofederalism in the post-Communist region. One possible explanation 
(explored in Bunce 2004) for this is the timing of ethnofederalism’s development in 
the region. As ethnofederalism is a legacy of Communist regimes, having control of 
an ethnofederal unit may not be perceived by an ethnic group as a sufficient guarantee 
against state repression. After all, ethnofederal structures in the Communist period 
were seen as instruments of state control of ethnic minorities through the cooptation 
of ethnic elites rather than as a means for minority empowerment. Ethnofederalism 
established through negotiations with minorities (as opposed to its imposition by the 
center) and with real powers may have a substantially different effect. 
Also disconfirming the expectations of reciprocal vulnerability theory is that 
democratic transition through rupture decreases levels of ethnic conflict and higher 
levels of ethnic group involvement in the transition process increases levels of 
rebellion. 
 Table 4.9 summarizes the support found for various hypotheses within the 








H1 Past economic or political discrimination 
increases levels of rebellion 
Supported Weakly 
supported 
H2 Past repression increases levels of rebellion Partially 
supported 
Not supported 
H3 Lost autonomy increases levels of rebellion Not supported Supported 
H4 Past intercommunal conflict increases levels 
of rebellion 
Not supported Supported 
H5 Democratization through rupture increases 
levels of rebellion 
Not supported Weakly 
supported 
H6 Inclusion in democratic opposition decreases 
levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H7a Federalism decreases rebellion (and group 
majority in federal unit) 
Not supported Supported 
H7b Ethnofederalism decreases rebellion (jointly 
significant with other forms of 
decentralization) 
Not supported Weakly 
supported 
H7c Autonomy decreases rebellion (jointly 




H8 Proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H9 Neither parliamentarism or presidentialism 
are correlated with rebellion 
Supported Not supported 
H10 Parliamentary systems with proportional 
electoral rules decrease rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H11 Presidential systems with constrained 
executives decrease rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H12 Young states have higher levels of rebellion Not supported Not supported 
H13 Young regimes have higher levels of 
rebellion 




 The overall results from the preceding analyses show only weak support for 
the constellation of hypotheses derived from reciprocal vulnerability theory. Among 




significant. In each analysis, it is associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion, as 
would be expected by reciprocal vulnerability theory. This is a result that warrants 
more detailed research in the future, as the intercommunal conflict variable in this 
analysis captures the highest level of conflict but not other dimensions of the conflict. 
The conflicts coded may be with ethnic groups that have a privileged relationship 
with the state or with other disadvantaged ethnic groups. Additionally, there is no 
modeling of whether the ethnic group that is the subject of study is the victim or the 
aggressor (or both) in the conflict. These questions have significance for further 
theoretical refinement. So, for example, if the ethnic group being studied is the 
aggressor and is targeting an ethnic group that is privileged by the state, then that 
communal conflict may be better conceptualized as another facet of rebellion against 
the state. This would be expected by reciprocal vulnerable theory. However, if the 
ethnic group in question is targeting another disadvantaged minority, then the causal 
mechanisms connecting communal violence to ethnic rebellion are much more 
difficult to conceptualize in terms of reciprocal vulnerability. 
A history of lost autonomy reaches significance in four out of six analyses and 
is associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion. This relationship is in the 
predicted direction. As discussed previously, an interesting wrinkle emerges in the 
sub-sample analyses. The effect of lost autonomy has almost three to nearly seven 
times (depending on method of statistical analysis) the effect in the developing 
context as it does in the post-Communist context. Again, this may be the result of a 




accommodated through various forms of governmental decentralization than are 
groups in the developing world.  
Political discrimination, by itself, reaches significance in only the sub-sample 
analyses using regression with panel-corrected standard errors. A larger effect is seen 
in the post-Communist sub-sample. However, coefficients in the full-sample analyses 
are in the predicted direction. Similarly, economic discrimination, when considered 
alone, does not reach significance in any of the analyses. Furthermore, in the fixed-
effects vector decomposition analysis of the post-Communist sample, the coefficient 
has the opposite sign as expected by reciprocal vulnerability. Jointly, however, 
economic and political discrimination are significant in every analysis and, when 
considered together, are uniformly associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion, 
as predicted. 
The repression variables – alone or in linear combination – also fail to reach 
significance, except in the FEVD analysis of the post-Communist region. In that 
analyses, repression of nonviolent political actors was associated with lower levels of 
ethnic rebellion, an effect opposite of what reciprocal vulnerability theory would 
predict. However, the effect of repression of violent actors was in the direction 
predicted and associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion. These findings, 
together, are also opposite of what would be expected by reciprocal vulnerability’s 
rationalist rival, collective action theory, which predicts a displacement effect. The 
coefficients for the repression variables where they did not reach significance are 
frequently in the opposite directions as predicted; however, the substantive effect is 




Among the institutional variables, forms of decentralization are consistently 
significant and generally associated with lower levels of rebellion, as predicted by 
reciprocal vulnerability theory. While these results carried over into the sub-sample 
analysis of groups in developing countries, results are different for groups in post-
Communist countries. While autonomy is still associated with lower levels of 
rebellion, ethnofederalism and minority control of a federal unit are associated with 
higher rebellion scores. As discussed previously, one possible explanation for these 
anomalous results is that in most post-Communist countries, ethnofederal and federal 
structures are legacies of Communist regimes and may therefore lack the legitimacy 
necessary to dampen ethnic rebellion. 
Neither type of electoral system nor whether a system is parliamentary or 
presidential is significant when considered alone. However, parliamentary systems 
with more proportional electoral rules are associated with higher levels of ethnic 
conflict in developing countries. This is the opposite result from what is predicted by 
reciprocal vulnerability theory. The question is raised why a political system in which 
ethnic minorities would perhaps be more able to garner political representation would 
exhibit higher levels of ethnic rebellion. One possible explanation is that highly 
proportional electoral systems – such as those with low minimum thresholds to gain 
representation – my result in ethnic extremists from other ethnic groups
8
 becoming 
part of the government (and potentially part of the governing coalition). The inclusion 
of such extremists – regardless of the inclusion of the ethnic minority under 
consideration – could result in perceptions of increased vulnerability. Similarly, 
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 In many cases, these ethnic extremists would be from the majority or plurality ethnic group. 
However, in more diverse countries, the ethnic extremists may be from another disadvantaged group or 




highly proportional electoral rules may also result in ethnic extremists from the ethnic 
group in question to gain seats, giving them added legitimacy and a platform from 
which to propagate their message. If those ethnic extremists choose to spread fear 
regarding the intentions of other groups, that could also increase perceptions of 
vulnerability which could, in turn, result in higher levels of ethnic rebellion. These 
scenarios fit the logic of reciprocal vulnerability theory. However, without further 
investigation, it cannot be determined if they are more or less common in the cases 
being studied. 
In the post-Communist sub-sample, different institutional arrangements than 
in developing countries are associated with higher levels of ethnic conflict. 
Presidential systems with more highly constrained executives are associated with 
higher levels of rebellion in post-Communist countries. This effect is opposite from 
what would be expected according to reciprocal vulnerability theory. One possible 
explanation may be found by more closely examining the source of constraints on the 
executive. So, if the actor (or actors) serving as a constraint on the powers of the 
executive is seen as being hostile or threatening to ethnic minorities, then the 
perceived vulnerability of those minorities may increase. This, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of ethnic rebellion. For example, the fact that many executives in Latin 
America have faced constraints imposed by activist militaries would do very little to 
reassure minority – and especially indigenous – populations, since those militaries 





A different type of constraint on executive power – competitive executive 
recruitment – has a more positive effect on levels of ethnic rebellion. In the full 
sample of cases, presidential systems with the most competition for executive 
recruitment have lower levels of ethnic rebellion in the regression analysis with 
panel-corrected standard errors. 
Among variables intending to capture the effects of uncertainty, the type of 
democratic transition (pacted or rupture) is the most consistently significant. In the 
regression analysis with panel-corrected standard errors, ruptures are associated with 
higher levels of ethnic rebellion, as predicted by reciprocal vulnerability theory, 
although the significance level is marginal. However, in the sub-sample analyses, a 
different pattern emerges. In the post-Communist context, ruptures are associated 
with lower levels of rebellion while in the developing context the opposite is true. 
State age is the only other indicator of uncertainty that reaches significance in 
any of the analyses. In the post-Communist sub-sample, older states exhibit higher 
levels of rebellion than younger states. This is the opposite of what would be 
expected based on reciprocal vulnerability theory. 
As the above discussion shows, the analyses in this chapter show little support 
for hypotheses derived from reciprocal vulnerability theory. Not only do many 
indicators fail to reach statistical significance, several have significant effects in the 
opposite direction from that predicted by the theory. Furthermore, those hypotheses 
which are supported in multiple analyses are consistent not only with reciprocal 
vulnerability theory but also with grievance-based theories. The lack of support for 




of transition type and ethnic involvement in transition), which are associated 
primarily with reciprocal vulnerability theory but not with either grievance- or 
resource mobilization-based theories of ethnic conflict, especially undermines the 
theory’s claim to generalizability. 
 However, further exploration is still warranted on several levels. First, there is 
the question of the determinants of the absolute level of rebellion versus the 
determinants of changes in levels of ethnic rebellion. This is a question that will be 
explored in the following chapter. Second, and beyond the immediate scope of this 
study, is the continued differences between post-Communist ethnic minorities and 
those in the developing world. It was initially thought that differences between these 
two sets of ethnic minorities could be explained by one of several factors: differences 
in the political structures of the states in which they reside; differences in histories of 
lost autonomy; differences in levels or targets of repression following 
democratization; differences in dominant mode of democratization in post-
Communist versus developing countries; or some combination of the above. 
However, the effects of these variables – with various controls applied and in two 
methodologically distinct analyses – diverge for minorities in these two areas. While 
the preceding analyses may be considered to eliminate a considerable number of 
plausible explanations for differences in post-Communist countries versus the 
developing world, they have not been successful in identifying factors to explain such 
differences. Further directions to explore these discrepancies will be presented in the 




Chapter 5:  Quantitative Analysis: Changes in Ethnic Rebellion 
 
Summary Characteristics of the Data 
The independent variables of interest in the following analysis measure 
changes in the level of rebellion employed by an ethnic group after a democratic 
transition takes place. As mentioned previously, these analyses are conducted as the 
correlates of changes in the level of ethnic rebellion may be distinct from the 
correlates of particular levels of rebellion. Furthermore, the use of a lagged dependent 
variable does not answer the question of interest: namely, what are the correlates of 
changes from the pre-transition level of rebellion in the post-transition time period. 
For these purposes, two different measures are used to gauge what variables impact 
change in levels of rebellion. First, MOREREBMAX measures if a year post-




Less than maximum level
of rebellion pre-transition
Equal to maximum level of
rebellion pre-transition
More than maximum level
of rebellion pre-transition





employed during the five years prior to the transition. Figure 5.1 gives the number of 
group-years that levels of rebellion increased, decreased or remained unchanged from 
the pre-transition maximum. Second, MOREREBMED measures if a year post-
transition has a greater level of rebellion than the median level of rebellion for the 
five years prior to transition. Figure 5.2 gives the distribution of this variable. 
 
As can be seen from the above distributions, discussion of whether ethnic 
rebellion decreases or increases following a democratic transition depends heavily on 
what the measure of comparison is. Decreases from the maximum level of rebellion 
are much more frequent than are decreases from the median level of rebellion.  
Analysis: Ordinal Logit Regression 
 To test the impact of the independent variable on changes in ethnic rebellion, 
an ordinal logit regression (clustered on the ethnic group and with a lagged dependent 




Less than median level of
rebellion pre-transition
Equal to median level of
rebellion pre-transition
More than median level of
rebellion pre-transition





variable falling in a particular category (in this case, increase, decrease, or no change 
in rebellion) based on the values of the independent variables (Vermunt and Jacques 




Table 5.1 Results for Ordinal Logit Regression 
Variable 
Category 








Lag of dependent 
variable 
Rebellion  















Repression -- civilians  





Repression -- nonviolent 





Repression --violent actors  


































































































































 p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 
N = 412 (80 clusters) 
 
In addition, several combinations of variables are tested for joint significance 
in both regressions. Economic and political discrimination are jointly significant at 
the .05 level and result in higher odds of rebellion being more than the maximum 
level from the pre-transition period. Minority control of a federal unit, 
ethnofederalism, and autonomy are jointly significant at the .05 level and result in 
higher odds for lower levels of rebellion in the post-transition period than experienced 
in the pre-transition period. No other combination of variables is significant in 
determining whether rebellion in the post-transition period is higher or lower than the 




A different set of combinations is significant when change from the median 
level of rebellion in the pre-transition period (MOREREBMED) is the dependent 
variable of interest. Repression against ethnic civilians and non-violent political 
actors are jointly significant at the .05 and are associated with increases in rebellion in 
the post-transition period. Additionally, two combinations of variables are associated 
with decreases in the level of rebellion in the post-transition period. First, ethnic 
control of a federal unit, ethnofederalism and autonomy are marginally significant at 
the .1 level. Additionally, the presence of constrained executives and competitive 
executive recruitment are jointly significant at the .001 level. 
Interpretation of Results 
Interpretation of ordinal logit is less straightforward than OLS regression, as 
the effect of any independent variable depends on the levels of the other independent 
variables. Table 5.2 provides the discrete change in predicted probability of ethnic 
rebellion decreasing, remaining the same of increasing from the pre-transition 
maximum value for variables that were significant either singly or in linear 
combination. All non-dichotomous variables were held at their mean values; 
dichotomous variables were held at 0, except for having a parliamentary system, 
which was held at 1. Table 5.2 describes results for the developing world, since the 
indicator for groups in post-Communist countries is held at 0. Results specific to 





Table 5.2  Changes in Predicted Probabilities for Changes from Pre-Transition 
Maximum Level of Ethnic Rebellion in Developing Countries 
Variable Decrease No Change Increase 
Political 
discrimination 
   
 Min→Max
1
 -.176 .087 .090 
 -/+sd/2
2
 -.070 .040 .031 
Repression-civilians 
(lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .017 -.010 -.007 
 -/+sd/2 .005 -.003 -.002 
Repression-nonviolent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max -.144 -.079 .222 
 -/+sd/2 -.068 .038 .030 
Repression-violent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .124 -.090 -.035 
 -/+sd/2 .034 -.019 -.015 
Autonomy    
 0→1 .468 -.412 -.057 
Control of federal unit    
 0→1 .247 -.206 -.041 
Ethnofederalism    
 0→1 -.022 .011 .011 
More than 25% of 
population outside 
ethnofederal unit 
   
 0→1 -.132 -.345 .477 
Pr (y|x) .141 .803 .056 
 
As shown in the table above, as political discrimination against the ethnic 
group increases from its minimum to its maximum value, the probability that the 
group will engage in higher levels of rebellion than the pre-transition maximum 
increases by .090. As repression against civilian members of the ethnic group’s 
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 Signifies movement in variable value from minimum to maximum value 
2




population goes from the minimum to maximum, the probability that the group will 
engage in more rebellion than the pre-transition maximum level decreases by .007. 
Increases in the level of repression against violent political actors decreases the 
probability of higher levels of rebellion by .335. However, increases from the 
minimum to the maximum level of repression against non-violent political actors 
increases the probability that ethnic rebellion will increase from its pre-transition 
maximum by .222. 
 Among the institutional indicators, autonomy for the ethnic group results in a 
decreased probability of higher levels of rebellion by .057. Similarly, ethnofederalism 
decreases the probability of increases from the pre-transition maximum level of 
rebellion by .041 while minority control of a federal unit increases that probability by 
.011 in the developing context. Having more than 25 percent of the ethnic population 
outside a federal unit under its control compounds that increase, with such groups 
showing an increase in the probability of higher levels of rebellion of .477.  
The above analysis is based on the developing sample only. Table 5.3 
provides discrete changes in the predicted probabilities of ethnic rebellion decreasing, 
staying the same, or increasing with changes in the levels of relevant variables for 




Table 5.3 Changes in Predicted Probabilities for Changes from Pre-Transition 
Maximum Level of Ethnic Rebellion in Post-Communist Countries 
Variable Decrease No Change Increase 
Political 
discrimination 
   
 Min→Max
3
 -.092 -.081 .173 
 -/+sd/2
4
 -.036 -.025 .061 
Repression-civilians 
(lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .009 .005 -.014 
 -/+sd/2 .003 .002 -.004 
Repression-nonviolent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max -.070 -.289 .359 
 -/+sd/2 -.035 -.025 .060 
Repression-violent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .068 .004 -.071 
 -/+sd/2 .018 .013 -.030 
Autonomy    
 0→1 .329 -.209 -.120 
Control of federal unit    
 0→1 .148 -.063 -.086 
Ethnofederalism    
 0→1 -.011 .-011 .022 
More than 25% of 
population outside 
ethnofederal unit 
   
 0→1 -.062 -.542 .604 
Pr (y|x) .067 .814 .120 
 
As shown in the table above, as political discrimination against the ethnic 
group increases from its minimum to its maximum value, the probability that the 
group will engage in higher levels of rebellion than the pre-transition maximum 
increases by .173. As repression against civilian members of the ethnic group’s 
population goes from the minimum to maximum, the probability that the group will 
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engage in more rebellion than the pre-transition maximum level decreases by .014. 
Increases in the level of repression against violent political actors decrease the 
probability of higher levels of rebellion by .071. However, increases from the 
minimum to the maximum level of repression against non-violent political actors 
increase the probability that ethnic rebellion will increase from its pre-transition 
maximum by .359. 
 Among the institutional indicators, autonomy for the ethnic group results in a 
decreased probability of higher levels of rebellion by .120. Similarly, ethnofederalism 
decreases the probability of increases from the pre-transition maximum level of 
rebellion by .086 while minority control of a federal unit increases that probability by 
.022 in the post-Communist context. Having more than 25 percent of the ethnic 
population outside a federal unit under its control compounds that increase, with such 
groups showing an increase in the probability of higher levels of rebellion of .604. 
 The results from the post-Communist region are similar to the results from the 
developing the region, although some of the effects seem intensified. So, for example, 
the impact of political discrimination increasing from its minimum to its maximum 
has nearly double the effect in the post-Communist region as in the developing 
context. 
 The above analyses refer to changes in predicted probabilities when the 
dependent variable is changes from the maximum level of rebellion in the pre-
transition period. Table 5.4 provides the discrete change in predicted probability of 
ethnic rebellion decreasing, remaining the same or increasing from the pre-transition 




other variables. As before, all non-dichotomous variables were held at their mean 
values; dichotomous values were held at 0, except for having a parliamentary system, 
which was held at 1. This interpretation of the results is for the developing world, 
since the indicator for groups in the post-Communist region is held constant at 0; an 
additional interpretation based on groups in the post-Communist region will follow. 
Table 5.4 Change in Predicted Probabilities for Changes from Pre-Transition 
Median Level of Ethnic Rebellion in Developing Countries 
Variable Decrease No Change Increase 
Repression-civilians 
(lagged) 
   
 Min→Max
5
 -.008 -.355 .363 
 -/+sd/2
6
 -.004 -.069 .071 
Repression-nonviolent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max -.006 -.266 .272 
 -/+sd/2 -.002 -.070 .072 
Repression-violent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .033 .302 -.335 
 -/+sd/2 .005 .144 -.149 
Autonomy    
 0→1 .192 .213 -.405 
Electoral system    
 Min→Max .031 .655 -.686 
 -/+sd/2 .009 .238 -.247 
Presidential system – 
competitive executive 
recruitment  
   
 Min→Max .154 .711 -865 
 -/+sd/2 .009 .250 -.259 
Regime age    
 Min→Max -.008 -.309 .317 
 -/+sd/2 -.002 -.033 .060 
Pr (y|x) .008 .618 .374 
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 As shown in the table above, as the level of repression used against civilian 
members of the ethnic group increases from its minimum to its maximum value, the 
probability that the group will engage in higher levels of rebellion than in the pre-
transition period increases by .362. Similarly, as repression against non-violent 
political actors goes from the minimum to maximum, the probability that the group 
will engage in higher levels of rebellion post-transition increases by .272. However, 
increases in the level of repression against violent political actors decrease the 
probability of higher levels of rebellion by .335. 
 Among the institutional indicators, competitive recruitment of the executive in 
presidential systems has the largest effect. Going from the least competitive to most 
competitive systems decreases the probability of higher levels of rebellion in the post-
transition period by .865. Autonomy for the ethnic group results in a decreased 
probability of higher levels of rebellion by .405. The most proportional electoral 
system lowers the probability of higher levels of rebellion by .686 as compared to the 
most majoritarian electoral system.  
 Finally, contrary to expectations, the oldest regime in the sample has a 
probability of higher levels of rebellion in the post-transition period greater by .317 
than the youngest regime in the sample. 
 The above analysis is based on the developing sample only. Although the 
indicator for the post-Communist region is not significant in the ordinal logit 
regression, the same analysis as above was carried out for that region to give a more 




Table 5.5 Change in Predicted Probabilities for Changes from Pre-Transition 
Median Level of Ethnic Rebellion in Post-Communist Countries 
Variable Decrease No Change Increase 
Repression-civilians 
(lagged) 
   
 Min→Max -.011 -.346 .357 
 -/+sd/2 -.005 -.096 .101 
Repression-nonviolent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max -.008 -.256 .264 
 -/+sd/2 -.003 -.062 .066 
Repression-violent 
actors (lagged) 
   
 Min→Max .043 .245 -.289 
 -/+sd/2 .004 .129 -.136 
Autonomy    
 0→1 .241 .098 -.340 
Electoral system    
 Min→Max .042 .624 -.666 
 -/+sd/2 .012 .214 -.226 
Presidential system – 
competitive executive 
recruitment  
   
 Min→Max .196 .642 -.839 
 -/+sd/2 .013 .225 -.237 
Regime age    
 Min→Max -.011 -.291 .303 
 -/+sd/2 -.003 -.052 .055 
Pr (y|x) .011 .682 .307 
 
 As can be seen from a comparison of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and of Tables 5.4 and 
5.5, there are not significant differences between the effects of the independent 
variables of interest on ethnic group rebellion in developing from post-Communist 
countries. This is a somewhat different result than that in Chapter 4, in which in the 
sub-sample fixed-effects vector decomposition analyses for ethnic group rebellion 





Discussion of Results 
 Depending on the dependent variable being used, somewhat different 
hypotheses are supported, although there are several supported by both analyses. 
Unlike the analyses in Chapter 4, in which discrimination (especially political 
discrimination) is found to be related consistently to higher levels of ethnic rebellion, 
political discrimination is only related to increases from the maximum level of pre-
transition rebellion in these analyses.  Furthermore, for economic discrimination, the 
relationship (although not significant) is the opposite of what would be expected from 
relative vulnerability theory. However, when groups face both political and economic 
discrimination, the compounded effect is higher odds of increased levels of rebellion.  
The results for repression, which only showed significant relationships to 
levels of ethnic rebellion in the post-Communist sub-sample in the Chapter 4 
analyses, also differ. Repression against non-violent political actors of the ethnic 
community significantly increases the odds of increased rebellion from the maximum 
pre-transition level, as expected. Furthermore, repression against group members of 
the civilian population results in higher odds of increased rebellion from the pre-
transition median, with the effect compounded when both the civilian population and 
non-violent political actors face repression. This is also the expected result based on 
relative vulnerability theory. However, the opposite effect occurred when considering 
changes from the pre-transition maximum level of rebellion. Not expected is the 
impact of repression on violent political actors. Relative vulnerability theory suggests 
that repression against violent actors would also increase the odds of higher levels of 




from pre-transition maxima, repression against violent actors significantly decreases 
the odds of increases in rebellion. This combination of effects – with repression 
against civilians and non-violent actors resulting in higher odds of increased rebellion 
while repression against violent actors results in lower odds of increased rebellion – is 
consistent with rationalist theories that predict a displacement effect (see, e.g., 
Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Saxton and Benson 2006). 
The impact of lost autonomy on changes in levels of rebellion is neglible and 
only weakly supported in the analysis of changes from median levels of rebellion in 
the pre-transition levels. This differs significantly from the analyses in Chapter 4, in 
which a history of lost autonomy is significantly related to levels of ethnic rebellion. 
Intuitively, it makes sense that histories of lost autonomy (which pre-date, sometimes 
by centuries, periods of democratic transition) would be more significant in 
determining overall levels in ethnic rebellion than in affecting changes in those levels.  
Similarly to histories of lost autonomy, past intercommunal conflict – which is 
a significant factor influencing overall levels of ethnic rebellion – is not a significant 
factor in determining changes in those levels. This is unexpected, as levels of 
intercommunal conflict are variable, unlike a group’s history of lost autonomy. One 
possibility for future exploration is to model the impact of changes in intercommunal 
conflict when analyzing changes in levels of ethnic rebellion. 
Neither the form of democratic transition nor minority involvement in (or 
opposition to) the democratic opposition has significant effects on changes in levels 
of ethnic rebellion. This is consistent with findings in Chapter 4, in which these 




emphasis on the roles of uncertainty and institutional inclusion on group response, 
these are findings that undermine the theory’s generalizability outside the cases in 
which contexts it was developed. However, it may be that further disaggregation of 
the ethnic group is necessary to tease out the impacts of involvement in 
democratization. For a sizable number of cases, there were organizations claiming to 
represent group interests on both sides of the democratization debate. 
Taken jointly, the impact of different forms of decentralization seem to 
decrease the levels of ethnic rebellion, although the impact is seen more clearly in 
decreases from the maximum level of rebellion pre-transition than from the median 
level. These findings are consistent with the results presented in Chapter 4, in which 
forms of decentralization are also associated with lower overall levels of ethnic 
rebellion. Taken together, the results support the expectations of reciprocal 
vulnerability theory, especially when taken in context to the results of having 
significant portions of the ethnic populations outside the unit under minority control. 
While not consistently significant, there are indications that having more than 25 
percent of the ethnic population outside the minority’s territorial unit offset the 
dampening effects on rebellion decentralization holds. 
Proportional electoral rules – as a single indicator – are not a significant factor 
in predicting changes in levels of ethnic rebellion. However, taken jointly with 
parliamentary systems, it is a more significant factor, at least when analyzing changes 
in the median level of rebellion in the pre-transition period. 
It was initially hypothesized that the type of governmental system would not 




parliamentary systems were significantly more likely to see decreases in levels of 
ethnic rebellion from the pre-transition median than presidential systems. While the 
significance level is higher for this analysis than for others, the direction of the effect 
is consistent with the analyses in Chapter 4 and the analysis of changes from the pre-
transition maximum. 
Despite the finding that parliamentary systems decrease levels of rebellion, 
presidential systems can be made less susceptible to ethnic rebellion through the 
imposition of constraints on the executive. Competitive executive recruitment was 
associated with decreased levels of ethnic rebellion in the analysis of changes from 
pre-transition medians. This is consistent with the whole-sample findings presented in 
Chapter 4, in which competitive executive recruitment was associated with lower 
absolute levels of ethnic rebellion.  
Finally, hypotheses regarding the effects of young states and young regimes 
are, in general, not supported by this analysis. In fact, in the analysis of change from 
the pre-transition median, older regimes had higher odds of facing increases in ethnic 
rebellion.  
 Table 5.6 provides a summary of hypotheses supported from the analysis 
performed with both dependent variables – changes from the maximum pre-transition 




Table 5.6 Summary of Hypotheses Supported, by Dependent Variable 
Hypothesis MOREREBMAX MOREREBMED 
H1 Past economic or political 
discrimination increases levels of 
rebellion 
Supported Not supported 






H3 Lost autonomy increases levels of 
rebellion 
Not supported Weakly supported 
H4 Past intercommunal conflict 
increases levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H5 Democratization through rupture 
increases levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H6 Inclusion in democratic opposition 
decreases levels of rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H7a Federalism decreases rebellion (and 
group majority in federal unit) 
Weakly supported Not supported 
H7b Ethnofederalism decreases rebellion 
(jointly significant with other forms 
of decentralization) 
Supported Weakly supported 
H7c Autonomy decreases rebellion 
(jointly significant with other forms 
of decentralization) 
Supported Weakly supported 
H8 Proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
Not supported Supported 
H9 Neither parliamentarism or 
presidentialism are correlated with 
rebellion 
Supported Not supported 
H10 Parliamentary systems with 
proportional electoral rules decrease 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H11 Presidential systems with 
constrained executives decrease 
rebellion 
Supported Supported 
H12 Young states have higher levels of 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
H13 Young regimes have higher levels of 
rebellion 
Not supported Not supported 
 
 In Chapter 4, additional analyses by sub-sample were performed. However, 
the number of cases required for ordinal logit is significantly higher than for OLS 




based on sub-sample will not be utilized here. Furthermore, given that the indicator 
for ethnic groups residing in the post-Communist world is not significant in the initial 
regression and that there are no significant differences in the effects of the 
independent variables on changes in probability, it is unlikely that such analyses 
would yield additional insights. 
 
Conclusion 
The above analyses provide very little support for Weingast’s theory of 
reciprocal vulnerability. When the dependent variable is changes from the highest 
level of rebellion pre-transition, only seven of the 13 hypotheses derived from 
reciprocal vulnerability theory have any support. When the dependent variable is 
changes from the median level of rebellion pre-transition, only six of 13 hypotheses 
are supported. 
In Weingast’s initial formulation of reciprocal vulnerability theory, he models 
primarily the onset or outbreak of civil violence (both ethnic and regional). The 
dependent variables used in this chapter deal with all changes in the level of ethnic 
rebellion, not merely changes from a state of no rebellion to a state of rebellion. In 
this sense, this chapter represented an extension of reciprocal vulnerability theory. 
However, the theory does not seem to stretch the limited distance from explaining 
onset of rebellion to changes in intensity of rebellion. The question remains, however, 
what theory does best explain changes in the levels of ethnic rebellion. 
Variables that do reach significance (either singly or in linear combination) in 




somewhat to collective action explanations of ethnic violence. That the compounded 
effect of political and economic discrimination (which indicates that the combination 
of forms of discrimination is not additive in its effects but multiplicative) is higher 
odds of increases in ethnic rebellion supports grievance-based explanations of ethnic 
rebellion, as do the ameliorative effects of decentralization.  
The effects of repression variables, however, are what would be expected 
from rationalist collective action theories, which would expect a displacement effect. 
That is, these theories expect that as the costs of nonviolent action increase (through, 
for example, repression of nonviolent actors), actors will rely increasingly on violent 
forms of collective action. Likewise, as the costs of violent action increase (such as 
through repression of violent actors), actors will rely increasingly on nonviolent 
forms of collective action. 
Given the above findings, it is evident that much work in both theoretical 
refinement and empirical testing is required before firm conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the mechanisms driving changes in levels of ethnic rebellion. However, 
from these initial results, it appears that a combination of grievance and relative costs 
of specific strategies is instrumental in determining the dynamics of ethnic rebellion, 




Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
Theoretical Review 
 The theory of reciprocal vulnerability postulates that outbreaks of civil 
conflict, including ethnic rebellion, are a result of preemptive uses of violence, 
conditioned on perceptions of vulnerability and the costs of being victimized 
(Weingast 1998). This theory argues that when the costs of being victimized and the 
perceived probability of being victimized reach a critical point – the point at which 
the expected costs of being victimized exceed the expected costs of fighting – then 
ethnic groups will choose preemptive violence.  
  Reciprocal vulnerability theory was developed in the context of two large-
scale civil conflicts: the American civil war (a regional conflict) and the wars of the 
former Yugoslavia (ethnic and regional conflicts). This study has sought to test and to 
expand the theory in several ways, although it has also applied it in a more limited 
manner in several ways as well. This study is a more limited test of the theory in that 
it is confined to ethnic conflict and also to countries undergoing democratization. 
However, it also gives more generalizable tests of the theory by expanding the 
geographic domain to include the developing world. Furthermore, it is a large-N test 
of the theory that includes cases of violence but also cases where violence has been 
non-existent. Furthermore, cases in which violence did occur were not limited to 
instances of large-scale violence or civil war. Instead, the instances in which violence 




results of the preceding analysis may not be generalizable to cases beyond those 
included, the cases do represent two large and important subsets in the global 
environment.   
Four sets of interrelated factors – conflictual histories, institutions, form of 
democratization and uncertainty – were hypothesized to impact perceptions of 
vulnerability, perceived costs of being victimized and/or the costs of violence. 
Conflictual histories – operationalized in terms of past discrimination, histories of lost 
autonomy, past repression, and communal conflict – were hypothesized to increase 
ethnic rebellion. Institutional forms of decentralization – in the forms of federalism, 
ethnofederalism or autonomy – were hypothesized to decrease levels of ethnic 
rebellion. Similarly, institutions that are more likely to provide access to the central 
government and protect the minority from central government – such as electoral 
voting systems and constrained executives with competitive recruitment – were also 
hypothesized to decrease levels of ethnic rebellion. Dynamics of democratic 
transition that increase uncertainty – operationalized as democratic rupture and ethnic 
group isolation from or opposition to democratization – were hypothesized to 
increase levels of ethnic rebellion. Finally, other factors that increase uncertainty – 
such as young regimes or young states – were also hypothesized to increase ethnic 
rebellion. The next section summarizes key findings for each of these four sets of 
factors and discusses them relative to reciprocal vulnerability theory and its rivals. A 
discussion of implications for policymaking that emerge from the analyses of this 








 Political and economic discrimination – when considered together – 
consistently are associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion, although they are 
not always significant when considered alone. This result is supportive of both 
reciprocal vulnerability theory and of grievance-based theories of ethnic conflict. 
Furthermore, the fact that economic discrimination, when combined with political 
discrimination, does not seem to hinder capacity for group mobilization for violence 
is a finding that deserves future exploration. Groups facing economic discrimination 
should find it more difficult to mobilize because of reduced material resources. 
However, this is not supported by the analyses in this study. The question then 
becomes how the group is garnering sufficient material resources to rebel. Two 
distinct possibilities suggest themselves. First is the possibility that group members 
engage in criminal activities to offset economic disadvantage. The second is that the 
group is able to solicit external support. The second possibility would fit the pattern 
of joint political and economic discrimination increasing rebellion particularly well, 
as groups that face political discrimination may be better able to argue their cause to 
external actors. 
 Repression – whether against the civilian population, nonviolent political 
actors or violent actors – does not seem to be associated with absolute levels of 
rebellion. However, there is an association between repression and changes in the 




including civilian, actors) appears counterproductive, while repression targeted at 
violent actors makes it more likely that rebellion will decrease. This finding is not 
consistent with reciprocal vulnerability. However, it is consistent with collective 
action theories of mobilization (see Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Saxton and Benson 
2006).  
 A history of lost autonomy is significantly associated with higher levels of 
ethnic conflict; however, this effect is much weaker in the post-Communist setting. 
This remains a conundrum worthy of further exploration. Ethnic groups in post-
Communist settings have, on average, higher levels of the lost autonomy indicator 
than groups in the developing world. Furthermore, the conventional wisdom suggests 
that majority ethnonationalist sentiment – which when combined with a history of lost 
autonomy may be expected to trigger defensive nationalism on the part of the 
minority – is more prevalent in the post-Communist region than in the developing 
world. However, the impact of lost autonomy is much stronger in the developing than 
in the post-Communist world. One possible explanation is the more widespread use 
of decentralized forms of governance in post-Communist countries than in developing 
countries as tempering the negative effects of histories of lost autonomy.  
 Finally, the presence of intercommunal conflict is significantly associated 
with higher absolute levels of ethnic rebellion, although no relationship with changes 
in levels of ethnic rebellion emerges. This is consistent with theories of reciprocal 
vulnerability. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that ethnic groups can sustain conflict 
with both the state and with other communal groups simultaneously. This result 




victim and victimizer, what is the relationship between ethnic antagonists and the 
state – in order to better specify the causal mechanisms driving this relationship. 
Institutions 
 Forms of administrative decentralization are consistently associated with 
lower levels of ethnic rebellion. However, the sub-sample analyses reveal that 
different forms of decentralization are effective in the post-Communist than in the 
developing context. In the post-Communist context, autonomy seems most effective 
in alleviating ethnic rebellion whereas in the developing context, forms of federalism 
are more effective. Part of this discrepancy may be due to Communism 
delegitimizing federalism as a means of minority empowerment (see Bunce 2004). 
This anomaly within the post-Communist world seems to be a result of a specific 
historical experience, not necessarily generalizable to other contexts. The findings are 
(in general) consistent with the expectation of reciprocal vulnerability theory, but they 
are also consistent with grievance-based theories. The findings (in general) are not 
consistent with resource mobilization theories that expect administrative 
decentralization to fuel rebellion by providing a base (territorial, financial, and 
population) for ethnic entrepreneurs. 
 It was hypothesized that more proportional electoral systems (especially when 
combined with parliamentary systems) would decrease ethnic rebellion. This 
expectation was only partially met. In the developing sample, parliamentary systems 
combined with more proportional electoral rules are associated with higher levels of 
rebellion, a finding which initially seems to undermine reciprocal vulnerability 




extremists from opposing ethnic groups (including the majority group) in gaining 
power, then that could increase perceived vulnerability on the part of the ethnic group 
being studied. If this mechanism is, in fact, present, then the finding would still be 
consistent with reciprocal vulnerability theory. However, further investigation is 
needed to see if this is in fact the story driving the statistics. In the analysis of changes 
from the median pre-transition level of rebellion, more proportional electoral systems 
and parliamentary systems, considered alone, do decrease the odds of increases in 
rebellion. The effect of highly proportional parliamentary systems, though not 
significant, is still to make increases in ethnic rebellion more likely.  
 Presidential systems are less prone to ethnic rebellion when executive 
recruitment is competitive. This is a finding that is consistent – and consistently 
significant – across modes of analysis. Since executive recruitment in democratic 
settings tends to be through majoritarian elections, one explanation is that 
majoritarianism may help promote moderation. If the median voter preference is 
likely to be more moderate, then the need to garner a majority of votes may in turn 
lead to a moderation of position by candidates for the spot of top executive in a 
presidential system. This finding is consistent with reciprocal vulnerability theory. 
Constrained presidential systems, however, appear more prone to ethnic rebellion. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the source of constraints on an 
executive may been viewed as inimical to minority interests. Further research, 
however, is needed to test this hypothesis.  




Dynamics of Democratization 
 Findings regarding the effects of type of democratic transition and ethnic 
group involvement in democratization are mixed. In developing countries, democratic 
ruptures are associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion, as predicted. However, 
in the post-Communist setting, ruptures are associated with lower levels of ethnic 
rebellion. The first finding is consistent with reciprocal vulnerability theory while the 
second is not. Further investigation – perhaps through case studies – is needed to 
explain the mechanisms driving these differences.  
 Ethnic group involvement in or opposition to democratization does not reach 
statistical significance in analyses in preceding chapters. This may be a situation that 
requires further disaggregation to the level of ethnically based organizations in order 
to tease out the dynamics as many ethnic groups have segments both opposed to and 
in favor of democratization efforts.  
Uncertainty 
 Hypotheses regarding the role of uncertainty received the weakest support in 
preceding analyses. Neither younger regimes nor younger states were more prone to 
ethnic rebellion. In fact, in the post-Communist sub-sample, it is older states that 
experience higher levels of ethnic rebellion. Contrary to the expectations of reciprocal 
vulnerability theory, ethnic groups seem willing to give new states and new regimes 
the benefit of the doubt. It may be that more precise operationalizations of uncertainty 
are needed to find significant effects. For example, in the case of new regimes, one 
could examine how turnover in certain key positions -- for example, leaders of 




effects, as most leaders of either new regimes or even new states have political 
histories prior to taking leadership of the country. 
 
Policy Implications 
 Several policy implications arise from the preceding analysis. Before 
discussing them, it should be noted that this analysis looks at relatively short-term 
effects – the first five years following a democratic transition. Further analysis 
comparing short-term effects to long-term effects is certainly called for before whole-
heartedly endorsing some policies over others. That being said, the above analysis 
does give considerable insight useful to the policy realm.  
First is the double-edged nature of state repression. Substitution was the main 
effect supported by the analyses in this study. That is, when states repress nonviolent 
actors, rebellion increases; however, repression of violent actors is more likely to 
result in a decrease in levels of ethnic rebellion. Thus, states would be well-advised to 
target their repression as narrowly as possible on actors engaged in violence against 
the state or other citizens. This may be a suggestion that is more easily said than 
implemented, as violent actors frequently embed themselves within civilian 
populations in order to shield themselves from repression or even to draw the state 
into the repression of civilians and thus increase the ability of the insurgents to recruit 
from that population. Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that the 
government that lashes out at a civilian population or political actors engaged in 




 The second policy implication deals with the benefits of decentralization in 
ameliorating ethnic rebellion. Despite concerns raised by the experience of post-
Communist states, in the preceding analyses forms of administrative decentralization 
are more consistently associated with decreases in the level of ethnic rebellion.  
 Third, is the relationship between parliamentarism and proportional electoral 
systems. There is evidence to suggest that either a parliamentary system or highly 
proportional electoral rules ameliorate ethnic conflict. However, the combined effects 
appear more deleterious. The analyses contained in this study suggest that 
parliamentary systems may be less prone to ethnic rebellion if they are less 
proportional. However, further research is still called for to determine how 
proportional is too proportional. 
 Other findings provide fertile ground to search for potential policy 
applications. One will be highlighted here: the impact of histories of lost autonomy. 
Policymakers are often seen as constrained by historical legacies that they cannot 
change. This is certainly the case. However, in the above analyses, it becomes 
apparent that historical legacies are not insurmountable. Histories of lost autonomy 
are uniformly associated with higher levels of ethnic rebellion. However, in the post-
Communist setting, those legacies are no longer significantly associated with higher 
levels of rebellion. What is less clear – and the reason why this remains fertile ground 
to till for policy implications – is why these histories are no longer having the impact 





Future Research Directions 
 Future research directions for this project take four different trajectories, 
beyond those avenues suggested in the summary of findings. First is the expansion of 
the temporal period of data collection. This has two aspects: the temporal expansion 
of democratization, which would result in a larger sample of cases being included; 
and coding for more years post-transition for each case. Currently, data for only five 
years post-transition have been collected. Expanding that data collection to 10 years 
may allow for other patterns to emerge. 
 The second trajectory for further research is to drill down an additional level 
of analysis to look at ethnically based organizations, in addition to ethnic groups as a 
whole. This would, in particular, allow for further refinement of analyses on the 
impact of governmental inclusion on levels of ethnic rebellion, as in many cases some 
ethnic organizations are included while others are excluded. In the aggregate analysis, 
this dynamic may be clouding results that disaggregated analysis will make clearer.  
 The third trajectory for further research is to expand the testing of cases to 
both established democracies and to authoritarian regimes. This will require more 
generic hypotheses (as several of the hypotheses tested in this work are specific to the 
democratizing context). However, these analyses could easily be extended to cases of 
liberalization that fall short of the democratization criteria used here and to cases of 
“reverse democratization,” or backsliding into authoritarianism. 
 The final trajectory to be discussed here is the addition of a qualitative 
component to the research program. Comparative case studies of both conforming 




hypothesized causal mechanisms are in fact occurring and for identifying additional 
causal mechanisms that can further theory refinement and explication. 
 
Final Words 
 Like many studies, the analyses in the preceding chapters have raised as many 
new questions as they have provided answers to the questions motivating the study. 
However, some conclusions may be drawn. First, although some findings support the 
expectations of reciprocal vulnerability theory, the overall picture is to undermine 
claims to its generalizability. Most of the expectations that found support are also 
consistent with grievance-based theories of ethnic rebellion. Furthermore, several 
hypotheses derived from the theory not only failed to find support but were actually 
refuted in the analyses.  
 Second, based on the sub-sample analyses in Chapter 4, we can conclude that 
the post-Communist experience is in some ways unique and not comparable to 
experiences in other parts of the world. The historical legacy of Communism seems to 
be salient even when democratization lags by a decade behind the fall of 
Communism.  
 Third, results strongly support grievance-based theories of ethnic rebellion 
with some results also providing more limited support to either resource mobilization 
or collective action theories. In particular, findings regarding the ameliorative effects 
of decentralization support grievance-based theory. Findings regarding the effects of 




additional research – with hypotheses and data derived from these theoretical 
viewpoints – is needed.  
 The challenges of ethnic conflict in general and ethnically based rebellions in 
particular are likely to stay with us for the foreseeable future, despite positive signs of 
more ethnic rebellions reaching negotiated settlements and fewer new ones erupting. 
Thus, the need for empirically based and theoretically informed research remains 
great. This study has attempted to contribute to the theoretical debates while also 
keeping an eye to issues of policymaking. Furthermore, it has opened new avenues 
for research that also promise to provide additional insights, both in terms of 
theoretical refinement and of policy innovation. These avenues will be pursued in 
future work, although with the understanding that the complexities of human behavior 




Appendix A: Cases 
 
Post-Communist Cases 
Country  Transition Year Ethnic Groups 
Hungary 1990 Roma 
Czech Republic 1993 Slovaks 
  Roma 
Slovakia 1993 Hungarians 
  Roma 
Macedonia 1991 Albanians 
  Roma 
  Serbs 
Croatia 2000 Roma 
  Serbs 
Serbia 2000 Kosovar Albanians 
  Croats 
  Hungarians 
  Sandzak Muslims 
  Roma 
Bulgaria 1990 Roma 
  Turks 
Moldova 1993 Gaguaz 
  Slavs 
Romania 1995 Magyars/Hungarians 
  Roma 
Russia 1992 Avars 
  Buryats 
  Chechen 
  Ingush 
  Lezgins 
  Karachay 
  Kumyks 
  Roma 
  Tatars 
  Tuvinians 
  Yakut 
Estonia 1991 Russians 





Lithuania 1991 Russians 
  Poles 
Ukraine 1991 Crimean Russians 
  Crimean Tatars 
  Russians 
Belarus 1991 Russians 
  Poles 
 
Developing Cases 
Country Transition Year Ethnic Group 
Dominican Republic 1996 Haitian Blacks 
Mexico 1997 Mayan 
 1997 Zapotecs 
 1997 Other Indigenous 
Guatemala 1996 Indigenous 
Honduras 1982 Indigenous 
  Black Karibs 
El Salvador 1984 Indigenous 
Nicaragua 1990 Indigenous 
Panama 1989 Blacks 
  Chinese 
  Indigenous 
Guyana 1992 Afro-Guyanese 
  Indo-Guyanese 
Bolivia 1982 Highland 
indigenous 
  Lowland indigenous 
Paraguay 1992 Indigenous 
Chile 1989 Indigenous 
Argentina 1983 Jews 
  Indigenous 
Mali 1992 Tuareg 
Senegal 2000 Diolas in 
Casamance 
Niger 1992 Tuareg 
Zambia 1991 Bembe 





South Africa 1994 Xhosa 
  Zulus 
  Europeans 
  Coloreds 
  Asians 
Namibia 1990 San 
  Basters 
  Europeans 
  Caprivians 
Madagascar 1992 Merina 
Sudan 1986 Nuba 
  Southerners 
  Darfur Black 
Muslims 
Taiwan 1992 Taiwanese 
  Aboriginals 
  Mainland Chinese 
Korea South 1988 Honamese 
Pakistan 1988 Sindhis 
  Pashtuns 
  Mohajirs 
  Baluch 
  Ahmadis 
  Hindus 
Bangladesh 1991 Biharis 
  Chittagong Hill 
Tribes 
  Hindus 
Philippines 1987 Moros 
  Igorots 
Indonesia 1999 Papuans 
  Acehnese 
  Chinese 
  East Timorese 
Fiji 1999 Fijians 





Appendix B: Variable Descriptions and Coding Rules 
 Dependent Variables 
REB Level of ethnic rebellion 
Taken from the Minorities at Risk project dataset (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 None recorded 
 1 Political banditry/terrorism (fewer than 6 
events 
 2 Campaigns of terrorism (6 or more events) 
 3 Local rebellion 
 4 Small-scale guerrilla warfare, characterized by: 
· fewer than 1,000 armed fighters 
· fewer than 6 armed attacks 
· attacks in small area occupied by group 
 5 Medium-scale guerrilla warfare, characterized 
by one or two characteristics of small-scale and 
one or two characteristics of large-scale 
guerrilla warfare 
 6 Large-scale guerrilla warfare, characterized by: 
· more than 1,000 armed fighters 
· more than 6 armed attacks 
· attacks in large area occupied by group 
 7 Civil war, characterized by: 
· all the characteristics of large-scale 
guerrilla warfare, plus 
· ethnic group controls base area from 
which in can exclude land forces of the 
state 
   
   
MOREREBMAX Change in rebellion from highest level in five years 
prior to democratization 
Coded independently, based on rebellion score 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 -1 Decrease 
 0 No change 
 1 Increase 
   





MOREREBMED Change in rebellion from median level in five years 
prior to democratization 
Coded independently, based on rebellion score 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 -1 Decrease 
 0 No change 





POLDIS Political discrimination 
Taken from the Minorities at Risk dataset (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No discrimination 
 1 Historical neglect/remedial policies 
 2 Historical neglect/neutral policies 
 3 Societal discrimination/neutral policies or 
remedial policies ineffective 
 4 Public policy discrimination 
   
   
ECDIS Economic discrimination 
Taken from the Minorities at Risk dataset (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No discrimination 
 1 Historical neglect/remedial policies 
 2 Historical neglect/neutral policies 
 3 Societal discrimination/neutral policies or 
remedial policies ineffective 
 4 Public policy discrimination 
   
   
REPGENCIV Repression against ethnic civilians 
Coded independently  
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 None recorded 
 1 Surveillance 
 2 Harassment 
 3 Nonviolent coercion 
 4 Violent coercion, no lethality 




   
   
REPNVIOL Repression against ethnic members engaged in 
nonviolent collective action 
Coded independently  
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 None recorded 
 1 Surveillance 
 2 Harassment 
 3 Nonviolent coercion 
 4 Violent coercion, no lethality 
 5 Violent coercion, lethality 
   
   
REPVIOL Repression against ethnic members engaged in violent 
collective action 
Coded independently  
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 None recorded 
 1 Surveillance 
 2 Harassment 
 3 Nonviolent coercion 
 4 Violent coercion, no lethality 
 5 Violent coercion, lethality 
   
   
AUTLOST History of lost autonomy 
Taken from David Quinn’s revision of Minorities at Risk 
dataset (2005) 
An indexed variable taking the following form: 
(MAGN+PRSTAT-1)/YEARWT  
   
 YEARWT Year autonomy lost or control transfer 
  -99 Missing/no information 
  0 No history of autonomy or transfer 
  1 <25 years ago 
  2 25-49 years ago 
  3 50-74 years ago 
  4 75-99 years ago 
  5 >100 years ago 





 MAGN Magnitude of change 
  -99 Missing/no information 
  0 No history of autonomy or transfer 
  1 Transfer centralized authority only 
  2 Loss of short-term (<10 years) autonomy 
  3 Loss of long-term autonomy 
    
 PRSTAT Group status prior to change 
  -99 Missing/no information 
  0 No history of autonomy or transfer 
  1 Autonomous but acephalous 
  2 Part of larger segment of group OR 
province in another state or territory 
  3 Traditional centralized authority OR 
autonomous region or province OR 
autonomous people under colonial rule 
  4 State or republic 
    
    
COMCON Intercommunal conflict (highest level with any non-state 
group in year being coded) 
Taken from Minorities at Risk dataset (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 None recorded 
 1 Individual acts of harassment, no fatalities 
 2 Political agitation, campaigns urging 
authorities to impose restrictions on group 
 3 Sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other 
small groups, some fatalities 
 4 Anti-group demonstrations, rallies, 
marches 
 5 Communal rioting, armed attacks 
 6 Communal warfare 
 
Nature of Democratic Transition 
TRANSITION Nature of transition 
Coded independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 Negotiated transition 
 1 Rupture 
   





ETHNICTRANS Ethnic group involvement in transition 
Coded independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 -1 Ethnic members advocate against 
democratization 
 0 Ethnic members either not involved in pro- or 
anti-democracy forces OR involved in both 
pro- and anti-democracy forces 
 1 Ethnic group members involved in pro-
democracy movement 
 2 Ethnically based organizations involved in pro-
democracy forces 




FEDERAL Is state federal? 
Taken from Saideman et al. (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
FEDCONTROL Is ethnic group plurality/majority population of 
federal unit? 
Coded independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
ETHFED Is ethnic group the titular group of a federal unit? 
Collected independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   





ETHFEDOUTPOP Does more than 25% of the ethnic group live outside 
the titular unit? 
Collected independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
AUTONOMY Does group have territorial autonomy? 
Collected independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
AUTONOUTPOP Does more than 25% of the ethnic group live outside 
the autonomous region? 
Collected independently 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
ELECTORAL Electoral system 
Taken from Saideman et al. (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 1 Majoritarian 
 2 Plurality 
 3 Semi-proportional 
 4 Proportional 
   
   
PARLIAMENTARY Is government parliamentary? 
Taken from Saideman et al. (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   







PRESIDENTIAL Is government presidential? 
Taken from Saideman et al. (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No 
 1 Yes 
   
   
XCONST Executive Constraints 
Taken from Polity IV (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 1 Unlimited authority 
 2 Intermediate category 
 3 Slight to moderate limitation on executive 
authority 
 4 Intermediate category 
 5 Substantial limitations on executive authority 
 6 Intermediate category 
 7 Executive parity or subordination 
   
   
XRCOMP Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment 
Taken from Polity IV (2002) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 1 Selection 
 2 Dual/transitional 
 3 Election 
   
   
PRESCONST PRESIDENTIAL * XCONST 
  
  
PRESCOMP PRESIDENTIAL * XRCOMP 
 
Uncertainty 
STATEAGE Number of years since state gained independence 
Collected independently 
   
   
REGIMEAGE Number of years since last change in regime 






GDPCAP GDP per capita 
Taken from World Bank (2006) 
   
   
GDPCHANGE Change in GDP per capita 
Taken from World Bank (2006) 
   
   
GOJPA Group organization for joint political action 
Taken from Minorities at Risk (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0 No organizations 
 1 Represented by umbrella organizations only 
 2 Represented by conventional political 
organizations only 
 3 Represented primarily by conventional 
political organizations but also by less 
important militant organization(s) 
 4 Represented primarily by militant political 
organizations but also by less important 
conventional organizations 
 5 Represented by militant political organizations 
only 
   
   
NUMSEGX Number of kindred segments in adjoining countries 
Taken from Minorities at Risk (2005) 
   
   
CULDIFXX Cultural differentials index 
Taken from Minorities at Risk (2005) 
 -99 Missing/no information 
 0  
 1  
 2  
 3  
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Appendix D: Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition, Full Sample 
Table D.1 Baseline Model with Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Rebellion – lagged one year .512*** 
(.072) 
Economic discrimination .076 
(.105) 
Political discrimination .063 
(.077) 
Repression – civilian actors, lagged one year .011 
(.027) 
Repression – nonviolent political actors, lagged one year .031 
(.025) 
Repression – violent political actors, lagged one year -.045 
(.037) 
Communal conflict -.014 
(.030) 
State age .006 
(.019) 















Table D.2 Regression of Static Variables on Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 


















Parliamentary * Electoral .023*** 
(.007) 
Presidential system -- constrained executive -.019*** 
(.005) 
Presidential system -- competitive executive recruitment .034*** 
(.010) 
Transition type -.152*** 
(.030) 




Group concentration .009 
(.016) 








Appendix E: Fixed-Effect Vector Decomposition,  
by Sub-Sample 
 























Repression – nonviolent political actors, 
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